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PREFACE
The scope of this dissertation covers three broad areas: Finance, real estate, and
insurance. Chapter 2 deals with how financial regulation and market design influence
information flows to analysts and hence the valuation of securities. Chapter 3 explores
the aspect of real estate valuation in residential gated and non-gated communities.
Chapter 4 covers the subject of the health insurance system.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation is prepared for submission to the Journal of
International Business Studies. There are two co-authors that helped me with this work:
Dr. Pankaj K. Jain from the University of Memphis, and Dr. Udomsak Wongchoti from
Massey University, New Zealand. Chapter 3 of this dissertation is a forthcoming paper to
be published in the Journal of Real Estate Research. Chapter 4 of the dissertation is
prepared for submission to the Journal of Risk and Insurance. The two co-authors for
Chapters 3 and 4 are Dr. Ronald W. Spahr and Dr. Mark A. Sunderman, both are from
the University of Memphis.
I am very grateful for all of the useful suggestions, comments, advice, guidance,
and hard work provided by my co-authors, members of the dissertation committee, and
colleagues.
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ABSTRACT
Radetskiy, Evgeny. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August, 2015. Three
Essays in Finance, Real Estate, and Insurance. Co-Major Professors: Ronald W. Spahr,
Ph.D. and Mark A. Sunderman, Ph.D.
There are three essays that comprise this dissertation. In the first essay we
investigate how a country’s enforcement of insider trading laws affects learning among
stock market participants. We measure learning as the speed with which analyst forecast
errors decline as the firm matures. We show that analyst forecast errors decline faster
with progression in the firm’s age (more learning), when insider trading laws are
enforced. We find that learning improves and M/B ratios stabilize faster with the
enforcement of insider trading laws. These learning effects are more pronounced among
countries with stronger regulatory infrastructure. Also, we demonstrate that firms with
higher analyst forecast errors and slower rates of learning before the 2008 financial crisis
have a significantly higher probability of stock crash.
In the second essay, we temporally examine the existence of price premiums for a
sample of single family homes in gated residential communities relative to values in
comparable non-gated communities in Shelby County, Tennessee. Controlling for
idiosyncratic attributes, we find that homes in gated communities carry significant price
premiums relative to similar homes in non-gated communities. Price premiums are
highest for medium size gated communities. Premiums were also evident in higher priced
gated communities before 2008 but vanished after the financial crisis. We conclude that
price premiums result from net gated community benefits.
The third essay develops a risk management proposal for a two-tiered privatepublic national health insurance plan. Under this plan, private insurers underwrite basic
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plans and perform most administrative functions. A second-tier, public national health
reinsurance plan allows truncated annual losses for private insurers. When private
insurers’ annual per person claims exceed a pre-specified level, additional claims are
underwritten by a single payer, public national health reinsurance system. We develop an
actuarial approach that considers possible contemporaneous correlation between paid
claim frequency and severity and first-order serial correlation. Given a first-tier loss
cutoff of $15,000, we demonstrate that premiums are reduced by approximately 60%
when compared to current private insurer pure premiums. We suggest that a two-tiered
health care system may better provide all citizens health insurance that is more affordable
for employers and individuals.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation consists of three essays on finance, real estate, and insurance.
The first essay explores the benefits of active insider trading law enforcement as it relates
to analysts’ learning and the valuation implication for the firm’s stock price. The second
essay deals with temporal valuation of price premiums resulting from the existence of
gates around residential communities. The third essay introduces an alternative risk
management proposal for a two-tiered private-public national health insurance plan.
In the first essay, titled “Insider Trading Law Enforcement and Its Impact on
Investor Learning,” I investigate how a country’s enforcement of insider trading laws
affects learning among stock market participants. I measure learning as the speed with
which analyst forecast errors decline as the firm matures. I find that learning improves
and M/B ratios stabilize faster with the enforcement of insider trading laws. These
benefits of insider trading law enforcement on the learning process which lead to quicker
equilibrium valuation is evident only in countries with better regulatory infrastructure. In
addition, I examine whether firms with higher analyst forecast errors and a slower rate of
learning before the recent 2008 financial crisis have a significantly higher probability of
crash. First, my analysis shows that analyst forecast errors reduce faster with progression
in an average firm’s age (more learning), when insider trading laws are enforced. Next, I
find that the speed of learning about a firm’s profitability and its impact on valuation
improve in an environment where insider trading laws are strictly enforced. Further, I
demonstrate that higher analyst forecast errors resulting from poor learning also affect the
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frequency of stock crash. My results provide the first evidence on the impact of insider
trading law enforcement on the learning process among stock market participants. The
enforcement of insider trading laws and the learning process about a firm’s profitability
have important implications for stock valuation and financial market stability globally.
The overall results in this essay suggest that the learning curve has to be considered as a
vital aspect when it comes to stock valuation.
In the second essay, titled “Gated Community Premiums and Amenity
Differentials in Residential Subdivisions,” I temporally examine the existence of price
premiums for a sample of single family homes in private, gated residential communities
relative to values in comparable non-gated communities in Shelby County, Tennessee. I
use hedonic models to examine price differences between single family homes in gated
communities and a matched sample in non-gated communities. Controlling for
idiosyncratic attributes, I find that homes in gated communities carry significant price
premiums relative to similar homes in non-gated communities. Price premiums are
highest for medium size gated communities. Premiums were also evident in higher priced
gated communities before 2008 but vanished after the financial crisis. I conclude that
price premiums result from net gated community benefits. I posit that our findings may
be applicable to other locations in the United States because of the ethnic, racial and
economic diversity of the sample. In addition, it is possible to develop a transactionbased monthly price index for real estate properties, using techniques applied in this
research.
The third essay, titled “Controlling Health Insurance Pure Premiums With a Twotiered Private/Public Structure,” deals with the development of an alternative risk
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management model for a two-tiered private-public national health insurance plan. Under
this plan, private insurers underwrite basic plans and perform most administrative
functions, including claims processing and basic underwriting. A second-tier, public
national health reinsurance plan allows truncated annual losses for these private insurers.
When private insurers’ annual per person claims exceed a pre-specified level, any
additional claims exceeding the pre-specified level are underwritten/reinsured by a single
payer, public national health reinsurance system. I use actual health care insurer loss data,
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) provided by the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. I develop an
actuarial approach that considers possible contemporaneous correlation between paid
claim frequency and severity and first-order serial correlation. Given a private first-tier
loss cutoff of $15,000, I demonstrate that premiums are reduced by approximately 60
percent when compared to current private insurer pure premiums. As a result, I suggest
that a two-tiered health care system that is more affordable for employers and individuals,
may better provide health insurance for an entire population.

3

CHAPTER 2
INSIDER TRADING LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON INVESTOR
LEARNING

INTRODUCTION
Well-functioning capital markets rely heavily on unbiased valuation to ensure that
both corporations and investors pay or receive fair prices for their securities. This
equilibrium, in turn, assures that valuable projects are financed and negative present
value projects are rejected, leading to sustainable and healthy economic development. In
principle, valuation of equity securities involves discounting the profits (dividends,
earnings, or cash flows) that a stock brings to the stockholder in the future. While much
of the financial research thoroughly analyze the finer aspects of discount rate and its
equity risk premium component, less attention is paid to the complications of the
numerator component of the valuation. Specifically, Pastor and Veronesi (2003) asserts
that the uncertainty about future profitability and forecasting errors, even if symmetric
around zero1, affect asset prices and valuations according to their learning model.
Although Pastor and Veronesi’s model focuses only on symmetric uncertainty about a
firm’s profitability, we further argue in this paper that asymmetric investor errors coupled

1

Bulk of the finance literature implicitly assumes that since the negative errors in
forecasting may be offset by an equal amount of positive errors, such errors may be
inconsequential in valuing stocks at the portfolio level.
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with abuse by insiders can significantly compound the problem and hinder learning in
stock valuation2.
The goal of this study is to investigate the impact of insider trading law
enforcement on the learning process and its valuation implications in the global setting.
Our most important contribution deals with the extension of the concept of speed of
learning beyond firm specific characteristics. Specifically, we demonstrate differences in
the learning process and its valuation implications in economies with diverse legal
frameworks. This is largely motivated by the work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV) since 19973 that emphasize how legal traditions and
institutional settings/quality can affect financial markets and firms operating in a given
environment. We look at the legal aspect that touches on fairness of information used in
stock trading and systematic abuse of investor errors in projecting future cash flows of
complex firms. We investigate the valuation implications of the learning environment by
testing whether stricter enforcement of laws prohibiting insider trading (IT) can
positively affect investor learning environment. In addition, we examine whether firms
with higher analyst forecast errors and slower rate of learning before the recent 2008
financial crisis have significantly higher probability of crash.
As generally described by Bainbridge (2000), insider trading is ‘trading in
securities while in possession of material nonpublic information’. Insider trading law
requires that virtually anyone who possessed material nonpublic information disclose it

2

Lack of transparency and abuse by insiders of financial markets anchored in investor
miscalculations can destabilize the financial markets by exposing it to crash risks such as those
seen during the crash of Internet bubble and the 2008 financial crisis.
3

See, e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997, 1998, 2002, and La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2006.

5

before trading or abstain from trading in the affected company’s securities. To the extent
that strict enforcement of insider trading laws discourages insiders (e.g., managers) and
quasi-insiders (e.g., lawyers, investment bankers, and so on) from exploiting their new
information about a firm in their trading, it should encourage market professionals (e.g.,
professional investors, analysts and traders, and market makers) to engage in public
information generation process which leads to better overall price discovery. This line of
thought is advanced by Haddock and Macey (1987). While Manne (1966) argues that the
free trading and thus sharing of information by insiders (who are more well informed
about the prospect of the firm) should promote the accuracy of stock prices, numerous
papers point out to the stronger incentive among at least managers of a firm to withhold
(adverse) information or even manipulate stock earnings and prices instead (e.g.,
Schotland, 1967; Jensen, 2005; Ball, 2001, 2009; Kothari, Shu, Wysocki , 2009; Wang,
2012, among others). Whether insider trading law enforcement promote or tamper
investors’ learning in stock valuation process is thus an interesting empirical question.
Although enforcement presents a significant trade-off in the learning process, the link
between enforcement and firm valuation has not been tested in literature in the context of
learning.
We conjecture that the enforcement of insider trading law enhances the learning
process about firms’ profitability among stock market participants. We test this
empirically in a cross-country setting that covers a universe of 56,289 international firms
(and its various subsets based on data availability from Datastream International and
I/B/E/S International). First, we establish the worldwide existence of a learning process
by observing the declining uncertainty around firms’ prospect as it matures. Our analyses
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also show that analyst forecast errors reduce faster with progression in an average firm’s
age (more learning), when insider trading laws are enforced. Next, we find that the speed
of learning about a firm’s profitability and its impact on valuation improve in an
environment where insider trading laws are strictly enforced. This result is consistent
with the view that the enforcement of insider trading laws promotes participation by
equity analysts and other market professionals in producing information, which in turn
enhances the process of resolving uncertainties about firms’ future prospects. Further, we
demonstrate that higher analyst forecast errors resulting from poor learning also affect the
frequency of crash4. For example, the frequency of crash during 2008-2009 is
significantly higher for firms with higher analyst forecast errors and slower speed of
learning before the crisis. Lastly, we show that the benefits of insider trading law
enforcement on the learning process which leads to quicker equilibrium valuation is
evident only in countries with better regulatory infrastructure (e.g., more credible signal
of effective implementation of rules and regulations regarding investor protection).
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we formalize our testable
hypotheses. Data and empirical results are provided in third section. We then conclude
and discuss some potentially fruitful directions for further research in section four.
TESTABLE HYPOTHESES
Hypotheses
Analyst forecast errors can affect the cross-section of stock returns through
investor sentiment. Baker and Wurgler (2006) predict that a wave of investor sentiment
has larger effects on securities whose valuations are highly subjective. Younger, higher
4

Investor learning is especially important to prevent massive abuse of investor errors by
issuers of equity in complex firms or creators of complex financial products.
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volatility stocks are particularly subject to such waves of sentiment. In particular when
beginning of period sentiment is high, these categories of stock are predicted to earn
relatively low subsequent returns and experience a reduction in valuation ratio such as
M/B over age. Whereas Pastor and Veronesi (2003) imply higher M/B for younger firms,
Baker and Wurgler (2006) allow for both positive and negative effects of sentiment on
valuation of younger firms.
In a well-functioning market, accurate stock valuation is critical in allocating
capitals. Jensen (2005) points to the prevalence of ‘agency costs of overvalued equity’.
Specifically, managers of overvalued companies are incentivized to engage in
opportunistic behaviors that help maintaining the higher volatility and thus ongoing high
stock prices even when these are not optimal to bondholders and stockholders5. We
propose that such opportunistic activities may become more severe if insider trading
activities are relatively easy. This, in turn, reduces the overall level of learning of
outsiders (including stock analysts). We argue further that this inferior learning among
stock market participants make these companies more prone to stock overpricing and
crash risks in the later period.
We test two main hypotheses about the effect of insider trading law enforcement
on learning and its valuation implication.
The first hypothesis deals with insider trading enforcement and the learning
process. We formulate the concept of speed of learning for a given change in the insider
trading law enforcement (IT) as the change in the rate of reduction of uncertainty in
analyst forecast in each year of a firm’s life as follows:
5

Wang (2012) showed that US overvalued companies indeed engage more in earnings
management to conceal negative information from investors.
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Hypothesis 1a: Reduction in uncertainty ∂σ2/ ∂t is faster with the enforcement of
insider trading laws than without the enforcement.
The learning environment can be affected by both regulations and the types of
participants present in the market. We focus on a key regulatory feature of the capital
markets, namely, the enforcement of laws prohibiting insider trading. While there is no
doubt that this law can affect information and price discovery process for financial
securities, whether it promotes or hinders the orderly information dissemination into
prices is a matter of great controversy among researchers and regulators. More
importantly, its impact on long-term price discovery in the learning context has not been
studied in literature.
The Learning Model
There is a reduction in uncertainty about the profitability of a firm with
advancement in its age, t:
𝜕𝜎 2
<0
𝜕𝑡

(1)

where σ2 represents the uncertainty about profitability. Newer firms tend to possess a
higher degree of uncertainty about their product demand, revenue stream, operational
cost, cash flow, and profitability. These uncertainties can manifest themselves in higher
analyst forecast errors in the early years of the firm’s existence and the increased
probability of stock price crash when there is an economic downturn or bad news about
the firm’s prospects. As time passes by, such uncertainties naturally resolve because the
firm goes through the concrete implementation of its business plans. The analysts can
also forecast the firm’s profitability more accurately for older firms with more data
availability on actual historic performance and financial results. We conduct original and
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direct cross-country tests of aggregate learning by investigating the relation between
median analyst forecast error from I/B/E/S international and the firm’s age6.
There are several reasons why analyst forecasts may affect stock valuation.
Inefficiency in analyst earnings forecast can lead to under-reaction to negative
information and over-reaction to positive information as shown by Easterwood and Nutt
(1999). The analyst forecast errors and uncertainty about firm’s profitability affect an
average firm’s valuations if the effects of uncertainty are explicitly modeled. Pastor and
Veronesi (2003) predict an inverse convex relation between M/B valuation ratio and firm
age due to greater uncertainty about the future profitability of newer firms. The genesis
of this relation is the convexity in the following valuation equation:

M
 E{exp[( g  r )T ]}  exp[( g   2 / 2  r )T ]
B

(2)

where M/B stands for market-to-book ratio, E{.} is the expectations operator, g is the
growth rate, r is the stochastic discount factor, T can be interpreted as the time after
which the firm is not expected to grow at an abnormal rate, exp stands for exponential. It
is a mathematical property of this equation that M/B increases in σ2 because of the
convex relation between growth rate and firm’s stock price valuation resulting from
effects of compounding. The gains from a positive surprise in growth rate of a firm’s
earnings asymmetrically outweigh the losses from a negative surprise of the same
magnitude. Innovative firms are valued highly even when their profitability is highly
uncertain based on asymmetry between compounding of potentially windfall gains versus
sharp losses. The absolute wealth increase associated with growth rates one unit above
6

Markov and Tamayo (2006) and Linnainmaa and Torous (2009) develop models to
explain predictability of analyst forecast errors based on a learning process, although their focus
is on separating learning from irrationality at the analyst level.
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average dominates the absolute wealth decrease associated with growth rates one unit
below average. With learning, such uncertainties (σ2) reduce over time. And according to
equation (2), M/B becomes less convex as g and σ2 approach zero. Thus, due to the effect
of learning on valuations, M/B is convex with respect to the advancement in a firm’s age.
We extend related theoretical and empirical research on this topic by Haddock
and Macey (1987) and Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002). The latter study shows that the
cost of equity for a country’s stock market is lowered when insider trading laws are
enforced effectively through actual prosecutions.7 However, the paper does not provide
any direct implication of insider trading laws for financial market learning and its
numerator effects on valuation. While a countervailing effect of such laws is that they
eliminate arguably the most informed participants from affecting the incorporation of
insider knowledge base about a firm’s profitability8, several studies point out to the
incentives for insiders (especially managers) to strategically utilize or manipulate such
information (Schotland , 1967; Kothari, Shu, Wysocki, 2009; Ball, 2001, 2009).
Specifically, Haddock and Macey (1987) posit that the hindering of insider trading
encourage market professionals (e.g., professional investors, analysts and traders, and
market makers, who are the next well-informed group (but with less incentive to
manipulate stock prices) of market participants to engage in the price discovery process.
As a result, we conjecture that the enforcement of insider trading laws enhance the

7

The article provides both the dates of enactment and first enforcement of insider trading
law prior to March 1999 and recommends that the latter date is more meaningful. We utilize their
reported dates while cross-checking and updating the numbers beyond March 1999. These
updated dates are shown in Table A1 in Appendix A.
8

Advocates for this strong form efficiency view include Cornell and Sirri (1992),
Meulbroek (1992), and Chakravarty and McConnell (1997) as they imply that insider trading
results in more rapid price discovery.
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learning process and speed up the equilibrium valuation. Thus, against the null hypothesis
of no effects of IT law enforcement, we test the following alternative:
Hypothesis 2a: Ceteris paribus, stricter enforcement of insider trading laws
improves investor learning environment and hence valuation is convex and attains
stability faster.
We test this hypothesis by dividing the firm-years into those before and those
after the first enforcement of insider trading law in each country. We compare the rate of
decrease in analyst errors and M/B ratio over time in markets with ‘enforced’ insider
trading law against the rate of decrease in markets without strict enforcement. As
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) point out, existence of laws prohibiting insider trading is
not enough; actual enforcement is necessary for the laws to have a positive effect. We
extend the logic by testing whether a strong regulatory infrastructure of a country is
necessary to improve learning by professionals by assuring a culture of strict and
effective enforcement of laws prohibiting insider trading. The World Banks’ World
Governance Indicators summarized by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011) contain
several legal infrastructure factors such as Government Effectiveness, Regulatory
Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our main data sources are I/B/E/S International and Datastream International. We
obtain data items forecast period (FPEDATS), stock ticker symbol (TICKER), median
analyst forecasted EPS (MEDEST), number of analysts or forecasters (NUMEST) for
each stock for each fiscal year end, and actual EPS (ACTUAL) from I/B/E/S summary
file for each of the 37,870 international firms during each available fiscal year and then
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focus on the period from 1981 to 2012. We obtain market-to-book ratio (data item
mnemonic MTBV), dividend per share (DPS), total assets (DWTA), return on equity
(DWRE), long term debt (WC03251), stock return index (RI), and stock price (P) for
56,289 international firms from Datastream International. We verify the accuracy of this
historical data by comparing it with Compustat Global data sets and Yahoo Finance for
one company in each country. The next important item we need is the age of each firm.
Direct information on this variable is not available in any traditional data set. Therefore,
we follow Fama and French (2001) and Pastor and Veronesi (2003) and use the year of
first appearance of a firm’s stock price in the data set as its year of birth.9 Subsequently,
we increment age by one year in each calendar year. We update the insider trading law
enforcement data set, originally created by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) in March
1999 using surveys, to 2013 using case law searches10. We cross-check their dates with
fresh information that has become available from various agencies’ news websites.11 We
discover that nine countries initiated enforcement actions after March 1999. We use the
updated list of enforcement dates from our research for Austria, China, Ireland, Egypt,
New Zealand, Pakistan, Portugal, South Africa, and Russia. The year of enactment of IT
9

We start this process from the year 1964 which is the first year of availability of price
data in Datastream (UK and Ireland). Our sample ends in the year 2012 implying that the
maximum age that any firm can attain in our sample is 48 years. We realize that the one-year old
1964 firms are actually older in age but such firms do not dominate our data set. Our results are
also robust when we exclude them and rerun the analysis for various sub-samples.
10

Our efforts allow us to more accurately capture enforcement initiatives. For example,
Australia has prohibited (enacted) insider trading laws in 1970 (Securities Industry Acts, s128)
and first prosecution was in 1991 in the case of R v Kian Lang Teh (an unreported decision of the
District Court of Victoria, Kelly DCJ, 2 September 1991). We use these updated dates for
enactment and enforcement in our analysis instead of those reported by Bhattacharya and Daouk
(2002).
11

The updated dates of enforcement are obtained from publicly available sources as well
as requests for information directly to respective countries’ regulatory bodies through e-mail and
fax.
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laws and enforcement of IT laws are shown in Table A1 of Appendix A for each country
in our sample.
Evidence of the Learning Process in a Univariate Setting
Table 1 provides preliminary evidence consistent with hypothesis 1. Do market
participants around the world learn about a firm profitability and resolve these
uncertainties over time? To address this question, we investigate whether there is a longrun declining trend of analyst forecast errors with progression in a firm’s age. Analyst
forecast error is computed as the absolute difference between median analyst forecast and
actual year-end EPS, divided by the absolute actual year-end EPS. Panel A shows, that
median analyst forecast error is 19.02% for one year old firms and 11.63%% for 20 year
old firms. The difference of 7.39% between the two median errors is statistically
significant at 1% level and can be interpreted as the cumulative amount of learning. In
unreported results, we also verify that analyst forecast errors are larger for younger firms
than for older firms, whether we use raw analyst errors or errors scaled by stock price, or
for the reported variable, i.e., errors scaled by absolute EPS. Panel B indicates, that when
insider trading laws are enforced, total amount of learning is 7.42% as indicated by the
difference between median analyst forecast error of one year old firms and 20 year old
firms. The difference between the two median errors is statistically significant at 1%
level. However, Panel C shows that the total amount of learning is 4.14% and statistically
significant at 5% level, when insider trading laws are not enforced. This finding verifies
an important but untested assumption implicit in the learning model which states that
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Table 1
Insider trading and the learning
We classify firms based on age, which is proxied by the first appearance of a firm in
DataStream. We obtain median analyst forecasted EPS and actual EPS from I/B/E/S for
the years 1981 to 2012. Analyst forecast error is the absolute difference between the
median forecasted EPS and actual EPS, divided by the absolute actual EPS. Panel A
presents the declining trend of analyst forecast errors with firms’ maturity. We test
whether the means for age 1 and age 20 are significantly different using a paired t test
and report the results labeled Total Learning. Data are winsorized at the 99th percentile
and 1st percentile. n = 37,870 international firms.
*** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Firms’
age in
years

1

3

5

7

9

Panel A Analyst forecast errors (total sample)
Forecast
19.0
14.6 16.2 15.8 15.1
error (%)

12

14

16

18

20

14.7

14.3

12.9

11.5

11.6

11.5

11.6

Total
7.39%***
Learning
Panel B Analyst forecast errors when insider trading laws are enforced
Forecast
19.1
14.4 16.7 16.6 14.9 14.7 14.3 12.9
error (%)

Total
7.42%***
Learning
Panel C Analyst forecast errors when insider trading laws are not enforced
Forecast
17.5
18.2 18.8 16.7 17.6 10.3 15.2 13.1 11.7
error (%)
Total
Learning

4.14%**

15

13.3

stock market participants learn about a firm’s profitability with advancement in its age
and the speed of learning is faster when insider trading laws are enforced. These results
are consistent with hypothesis 1 that uncertainty about a firm’s profitability is reduced
faster with the progression in its age when insider trading laws are enforced.
Effects of Insider Trading Laws Enforcement on Learning
We now merge the firm-specific and country-specific information from the
various data sources i.e., I/B/E/S, Datastream International, and proprietary or handcollected time series database on the insider trading law enforcement for each country.
The purpose of this exercise is to understand the incremental effects of such law on
investors’ learning.
We define an insider trading enforcement indicator dummy variable (IT) and
assign it the value of one for the country-years when there is enforcement on insider
trading laws. We find a rich cross-sectional variation as well as time-series variation in
the learning environment features across countries. At the beginning of our sample in
1981, the proportion of firms from countries where prohibition against insider trading
was enforced is 12% and this proportion increases to 90% by 2013 (see Appendix A).
We estimate an incremental effect regression model similar to one proposed by
He and Ng (1998) because the insider trading law enforcement is a major event that could
affect the relation between analyst forecast error (AFE) and each of the explanatory
variables. The following regression model is estimated to investigate the incremental
effect of learning environment:
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AFEi,t = a0 + a.IT*AGE i,t + b.ITi,t + c.AGE i,t + d.NUMEST i,t + e.LOSS i,t + f.DD i,t
+ g.LEV i,t + h.SIZE i,t + i.ROEi,t + j.ROE(1)i,t + k.ROE(2)i,t + l.ROE(3)i,t
+ m.RET(1)i,t + n.RET(2)i,t + o.RET(3)i,t + p.VOLPi,t + q.IT. DIVi,t
+ r.IT.LEVi,t + s.IT.SIZEi,t + t.IT.ROEi,t + u.IT.ROE(1)i,t + v.IT.ROE(2)i,t
+ w.IT.ROE(3)i,t + x.IT.RET(1)i,t + y.IT.RET(2)i,t + z.IT.RET(3)i,t
+ aa.IT.VOLPi,t + ab.IT.NUMESTi,t + ac.IT.LOSSi,t + ε i,t
(3)
where i = 1- N, N being the number of firms in each year t. AGE is defined as - 1/ (1+
Firm’s Age) as this specification captures the convexity in the relation between AFE and
firm’s age. DD is the dividend dummy with value of one for dividend paying firms and
zero for nonpayers. LEV is the debt to asset ratio. SIZE is the natural log of the firm’s
total asset. Following Pastor and Veronesi (2003), that utilize the Bayesian updating
technique in their learning model, we include three leading years’ of return on equity
(ROE) which are especially important to control for future growth opportunities among
younger firms that may be expected by investors, outside of the learning context. RET is
future annual stock return up to three years from current period. Following Pastor and
Veronesi, VOLP (volatility of profitability) was calculated for every stock in the sample
as the residual variance from AR(1) model which predicts its return on equity (ROE). In
Model4 of Table1, the standard errors are clustered by firms to take into account residual
dependence created by firm effect. NUMEST represents the number of analysts following
the stock. We follow Gu and Wu (2003) in defining LOSS as an indicator variable equal
to one if forecasted EPS is negative and zero otherwise. This is done to control for
asymmetry bias in positive and negative earnings. All variables of firms in each country
are measured in its own currency.
We implement the tests in Table 2 on all countries in Panel A, all countries except
the US in Panel B, and countries which experience changes in IT law enforcement over
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Table 2
Impact of insider trading law enforcement on analyst forecast error
The estimates are obtained from the annual panel data regression analysis at the firm
level
AFEi,t = a0 + a.IT*AGE i,t + b.ITi,t + c.AGE i,t + d.NUMEST i,t + e.LOSS i,t + f.DD i,t
+ g.LEV i,t + h.SIZE i,t + i.ROEi,t + j.ROE(1)i,t + k.ROE(2)i,t + l.ROE(3)i,t
+ m.RET(1)i,t + n.RET(2)i,t + o.RET(3)i,t
+ p.VOLPi,t + q.IT. DIVi,t
+ r.IT.LEVi,t + s.IT.SIZEi,t + t.IT.ROEi,t + u.IT.ROE(1)i,t + v.IT.ROE(2)i,t
+ w.IT.ROE(3)i,t + x.IT.RET(1)i,t + y.IT.RET(2)i,t + z.IT.RET(3)i,t
+ aa.IT.VOLPi,t + b.IT.NUMESTi,t + ac.IT.LOSSi,t +εi,t
where Analyst Forecasting Error (AFE) firm i in year t is calculated as the absolute
difference between median forecasted EPS and the actually reported EPS, scaled by the
year-end stock price.(i = 1- N, N is the number of firms). IT is indicator variable for
Insider Trading law enforcement. For example, IT equals one if insider trading law is
enforced in a given country in a given year and zero otherwise and then that value is
assigned to all applicable firm-year observations. AGE is defined as - 1/ (1+ Firm’s Age),
which captures the convex relation between AFE and age according to the learning
model. DD is the dividend dummy with value 1 for dividend paying firm and 0
otherwise. LEV is the debt ratio. SIZE is the natural log of the firm’s total assets. ROE is
the return on equity and regressed up to three years following year t. RET is future annual
stock return up to three years from current period. VOLP is volatility of profitability and
was calculated for every stock in the sample as the residual variance from AR(1) model
which predicts its return on equity. ε i,t is the error term, which we cluster in SAS using
proc surveyreg function in Model 4. All variables of firms in a given country are
measured in its own currency. NUMEST is number of forecasts for particular stock-year.
LOSS is equal to one if forecasted EPS is negative and zero otherwise (Gu and Wu,
2003). Following He and Ng (1998), all of the base variables are interacted with the ‘IT’
dummy (Interaction Variables). All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. a indicates tstatistics that are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Models 2 and 3
include country and year fixed effects respectively. AFE > 200% are truncated following
Stickel (1992).
Panel A All Countries. n= 21,767 international firms
Model 1
Model 2
Intercept
0.425
(15.87)a
IT
-0.364
-0.257
a
(-13.54)
(-20.76)
IT_AGE
-0.160
-0.072
a
(-3.78)
(-3.01)
AGE
0.139
0.108
a
(3.31)
(4.59)
NUMEST
-0.001
-0.001
(-3.07)a
(-5.45)
LOSS
0.088
0.084
(2.88)a
(8.03)
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Model 3
-0.360
(-30.34)
-0.149
(-6.18)
0.138
(5.86)
-0.001
(-4.44)
0.092
(8.65)

Model 4
0.425
(11.06)
-0.364
(-9.48)
-0.160
(-2.76)
0.139
(2.41)
-0.001
(-1.99)
0.089
(2.76)

Table 2
Impact of insider trading law enforcement on analyst forecast error
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
DD
-0.059
-0.055
-0.057
(-4.27)a
(-9.82)
(-10.00)
LEV
-0.002
-0.009
-0.005
(-0.10)a
(-0.91)
(-0.52)
SIZE
-0.017
-0.014
-0.017
(-13.82)a
(-20.09)
(-26.26)
VOLP
0.016
0.021
0.016
a
(1.18)
(3.34)
(2.51)
ROE, ROE1,
YES
YES
YES
ROE2,ROE3
RET1, RET2, RET3
YES
YES
YES
Interaction Variables
YES
YES
YES
Country Fixed Effects
NO
YES
NO
Year Fixed Effects
NO
NO
YES
Adjusted R2
.080
.128
.090
Panel B All Countries. Excluding USA data. n= 16,638 international firms
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Intercept
0.425
(15.87)a
IT
-0.295
-0.233
-0.286
(-10.92)a
(-16.43)
(-20.92)
IT_AGE
-0.153
-0.088
-0.145
(-3.58)a
(-3.17)
(-5.25)
AGE
0.139
0.112
0.145
(3.31)a
(4.17)
(5.44)
NUMEST
-0.001
-0.002
-0.001
(-3.07)a
(-4.7)
(-4.31)
LOSS
0.088
0.084
0.093
(2.88)a
(7.02)
(7.69)
DD
-0.059
-0.055
-0.054
(-4.27)a
(-8.62)
(-8.44)
LEV
-0.002
-0.009
-0.005
a
(-0.10)
(-0.8)
(-0.48)
SIZE
-0.017
-0.014
-0.016
a
(-13.82)
(-17.47)
(-22.18)
VOLP
0.016
0.021
0.016
a
(1.18)
(2.94)
(2.22)
ROE, ROE1,
YES
YES
YES
ROE2,ROE3
RET1, RET2, RET3
YES
YES
YES
Interaction Variables
YES
YES
YES
Country Fixed Effects
NO
YES
NO
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Model 4
-0.059
(-3.59)
-0.002
(-0.08)
-0.017
(-9.55)
0.016
(0.93)
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
.081

Model 4
0.425
(11.06)
-0.295
(-7.68)
-0.153
(-2.63)
0.139
(2.41)
-0.001
(-1.99)
0.088
(2.76)
-0.059
(-3.59)
-0.002
(-0.08)
-0.017
(-9.55)
0.016
(0.93)
YES
YES
YES
NO

Table 2
Impact of insider trading law enforcement on analyst forecast error
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Year Fixed Effects
NO
NO
YES
Adjusted R2
.101
.141
.115

Model 4
NO
.101

Panel C Countries with change in insider trading law enforcement during our sample
period. n= 10,990 international firms
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Intercept
0.446
0.446
(15.62)a
(10.94)
IT
-0.254
-0.224
-0.250
-0.254
(-8.74)a
(-15.30)
(-16.71)
(-6.23)
IT_AGE
-0.116
-0.086
-0.113
-0.116
(-2.58)a
(-2.94)
(-3.88)
(-1.91)
AGE
0.149
0.117
0.157
0.149
a
(3.37)
(4.21)
(5.66)
(2.45)
NUMEST
-0.002
-0.001
-0.002
-0.002
(-3.33)a
(-4.17)
(-5.00)
(-2.16)
LOSS
0.089
0.084
0.093
0.089
a
(2.84)
(6.93)
(7.59)
(2.73)
DD
-0.057
-0.052
-0.049
-0.057
(-3.92)a
(-7.77)
(-7.30)
(-3.30)
LEV
-0.005
-0.008
-0.011
-0.005
(-0.24)a
(-0.66)
(-0.98)
(-0.19)
SIZE
-0.018
-0.016
-0.017
-0.018
(-14.32)a
(-18.48)
(-19.99)
(-9.92)
VOLP
0.014
0.020
0.014
0.014
(1.05)a
(2.80)
(1.91)
(0.83)
ROE, ROE1,
YES
YES
YES
YES
ROE2,ROE3
RET1, RET2, RET3
YES
YES
YES
YES
Interaction Variables
YES
YES
YES
YES
Country Fixed Effects
NO
YES
NO
NO
Year Fixed Effects
NO
NO
YES
NO
Adjusted R2
.113
.150
.126
.114
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the sample period from 1981 to 2012 in Panel C. The results in Table 2 lend further
support to our first hypothesis. There are 21,767 firms with valid data for all variables in
the final sample. Model 1 is basic OLS regression model with heteroscedasticityconsistent standard errors. Models 2 and 3 include country and year fixed effects
respectively. In Model 4, standard errors are clustered by firm.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the regression coefficient of IT*AGE is negative. In
other words, the negative and convex relation between analyst forecast error and firm age
is stronger (i.e., speed of learning and its impact on valuation is faster) after the
enforcement of insider trading laws. The estimates for variable IT simply indicate the
direct effect of insider trading law enforcement on the analyst forecast errors. The
coefficients in this row only capture the level of reductions in analyst forecast errors and
are not related to the learning model because the learning model requires an interaction of
the learning environment variables with the firm’s age. We observe that insider trading
law enforcement reduces analyst forecast errors in general. To assess the impact of IT
law enforcement on the speed of learning stipulated in hypothesis 1, we turn our attention
to the coefficients in the third row of each panel. Negative coefficients on IT*AGE
represent faster speed according to the learning model. Consistent with our hypothesis,
there is a negative coefficient on enforcement of insider trading which suggests that this
feature speeds up the learning process. When all countries are considered, referring to
Model 4, we find the negative coefficient of -0.160 (with t-statistic of -2.76). The results
are similar when we exclude US observations to verify the relevance of our study in
present times; the US started enforcing the insider trading law decades ago in 1961.
When we consider only countries which experience a regime change from no
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enforcement to strict enforcement of insider trading laws within our sample period from
1981 to 2012 onwards (Panel C), we find that the regression coefficient is equal to -0.116
(with t-statistic of -1.91). The overall conclusion from the table confirms that the
enforcement of insider trading laws enhances the speed with which analyst forecast errors
are reduced in the context of the learning model.
Evidence of the Valuation Implication in a Multivariate Setting
The learning model indicates an inverse convex relation between equilibrium M/B
valuation and firm’s age. Our second hypothesis indicates, that as a consequence of a
learning model, we expect to see a M/B ratio attain its convex equilibrium faster when
insider trading laws are enforced, as compared to when they are not enforced.
Next, we want to understand the incremental effects of insider trading law
enforcement on investors’ learning and its implications on stock valuation in a
multivariate environment. In Table 3 we estimate an incremental effect regression model
similar to one proposed by He and Ng (1998) because the insider trading law
enforcement is a major event that could affect the relation between market-to-book ratio
and each of the explanatory variables. The following regression model is estimated to
investigate the incremental effect of learning environment:
log(M/B)i,t = c0 + cd0IT.AGEi,t + cd1ITi,t + cd2IT.DIVi,t + cd3IT.LEVi,t + cd4IT.SIZEi,t
+ cd5IT.ROEi,t + cd6IT.ROE(1)i,t + cd7IT.ROE(2)i,t + cd8IT.ROE(3)i,t
+ cd9IT.RET(1)i,t + cd10IT.RET(2)i,t + cd11IT.RET(3)i,t + cd12IT.VOLPi,t
+ c1AGEi,t + c2DDi,t + c3LEVi,t + c4SIZEi,t + c5ROEi,t + c6ROE(1)i,t
+ c7ROE(2)i,t + c8ROE(3)i,t + c9RET(1)i,t + c10RET(2)i,t + c11RET(3)i,t
+ c12VOLPi,t + εi,t
(4)
Most of the variables are similar to those defined in Equation (3). Again, to
capture the incremental effect of the insider trading laws enforcement, we interact all
of the base variables with the ‘IT’ dummy. All variables of firms in each country are
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Table 3
Incremental effect regression: Impact of insider trading law enforcement on
learning and valuation
The estimates are obtained from the annual panel data regression analysis at the firm
level:
log(M/B)i,t = c0 + cd0IT.AGEi,t + cd1ITi,t + cd2IT.DIVi,t + cd3IT.LEVi,t + cd4IT.SIZEi,t
+ cd5IT.ROEi,t + cd6IT.ROE(1)i,t + cd7IT.ROE(2)i,t + cd8IT.ROE(3)i,t
+ cd9IT.RET(1)i,t + cd10IT.RET(2)i,t + cd11IT.RET(3)i,t + cd12IT.VOLPi,t
+ c1AGEi,t + c2DDi,t + c3LEVi,t + c4SIZEi,t + c5ROEi,t + c6ROE(1)i,t
+ c7ROE(2)i,t + c8ROE(3)i,t + c9RET(1)i,t + c10RET(2)i,t + c11RET(3)i,t
+ c12VOLPi,t + εi,t
where Age and other base variables retain their definitions from Table 2 and interactive
variables are obtained by multiplying the value of IT variable with the base variable. The
interactive variable specification follows the methods of He and Ng (1998). IT represents
the indicator variable for Insider Trading Enforcement. For example, IT equals one if
insider trading law is enforced in a given country in a given year and zero otherwise and
then that value is assigned to all applicable firm-year observations. All variables of firms
in a given country are measured in its own currency. .
All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. a indicates t-statistics that are based on
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Models 2 and 3 include country and year
fixed effects respectively. ε i,t is the error term, which we cluster in SAS using proc
surveyreg function in Model 4.
Panel A All Countries. n= 39,231 international firms
Model 1
Model 2
Intercept
-0.138
(-3.93)a
IT
0.999
0.762
(27.68)a
(22.06)
IT_AGE
-0.542
-1.007
(-6.93)a
(-14.01)
AGE
-0.172
0.058
a
(-2.28)
(0.84)
DD
-0.008
-0.073
(-0.40)a
(-5.02)
LEV
-0.363
-0.242
a
(-9.28)
(-9.02)
SIZE
0.045
0.074
a
(22.57)
(36.55)
VOLP
0.011
0.011
(1.36)a
(1.64)
ROE, ROE1,
YES
YES
ROE2,ROE3
RET1, RET2, RET3
YES
YES
Interaction Variables
YES
YES
Country Fixed Effects
NO
YES
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Model 3

1.038
(31.76)
-0.595
(-8.27)
-0.160
(-2.32)
-0.015
(-1.00)
-0.415
(-15.36)
0.048
(25.70)
0.009
(1.29)
YES

Model 4
-0.138
(-1.91)
0.999
(13.76)
-0.542
(-4.19)
-0.172
(-1.36)
-0.008
(-0.22)
-0.363
(-6.46)
0.045
(10.11)
0.011
(1.10)
YES

YES
YES
NO

YES
YES
NO

-

Table 3
Incremental effect regression: Impact of insider trading law enforcement on
learning and valuation
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Year Fixed Effects
NO
NO
YES
NO
Adjusted R2
0.075
0.153
0.123
0.075
Panel B All Countries. Excluding USA data. n= 29,975 international firms
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Intercept
-0.138
(-3.93)a
IT
0.798
0.718
0.849
(21.86)a
(20.41)
(25.11)
IT_AGE
-0.840
-1.203
-0.862
(-10.59)a
(-16.33)
(-11.59)
AGE
-0.172
0.052
-0.187
a
(-2.28)
(0.75)
(-2.65)
DD
-0.008
-0.073
-0.026
a
(-0.40)
(-5.00)
(-1.75)
LEV
-0.363
-0.241
-0.426
a
(-9.28)
(-8.88)
(-15.62)
SIZE
0.045
0.075
0.044
a
(22.57)
(35.90)
(23.11)
VOLP
0.011
0.011
0.009
(1.36)a
(1.61)
(1.29)
ROE, ROE1,
YES
YES
YES
ROE2,ROE3
RET1, RET2, RET3
YES
YES
YES
Interaction Variables
YES
YES
YES
Country Fixed Effects
NO
YES
NO
Year Fixed Effects
NO
NO
YES
Adjusted R2
0.085
0.170
0.139

Model 4
-0.138
(-1.91)
0.798
(11.02)
-0.840
(-6.46)
-0.172
(-1.36)
-0.008
(-0.22)
-0.363
(-6.46)
0.045
(10.11)
0.011
(1.10)
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
0.085

Panel C Countries with change in Insider Trading law enforcement during our sample
period. n= 20,626 international firms
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Intercept
-0.153
-0.153
a
(-4.35)
(-2.26)
IT
0.746
0.650
0.930
0.746
a
(19.82)
(17.89)
(24.85)
(10.95)
IT_AGE
-0.945
-1.220
-0.822
-0.945
(-11.43)a
(-15.66)
(-10.22)
(-7.02)
AGE
-0.211
0.083
-0.279
-0.211
(-2.76)a
(1.15)
(-3.76)
(-1.64)
DD
-0.070
-0.100
-0.100
-0.070
(-3.42)a
(-6.51)
(-6.38)
(-2.05)
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Table 3
Incremental effect regression: Impact of insider trading law enforcement on
learning and valuation
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
LEV
-0.426
-0.249
-.490
-0.426
a
(-9.84)
(-8.90)
(-17.26)
(-7.16)
SIZE
0.053
0.078
0.048
0.053
a
(27.02)
(35.96)
(21.88)
(13.91)
VOLP
0.007
0.010
0.006
0.007
(0.88)a
(1.41)
(0.79)
(0.70)
ROE, ROE1,
YES
YES
YES
YES
ROE2,ROE3
RET1, RET2, RET3
YES
YES
YES
YES
Interaction Variables
YES
YES
YES
YES
Country Fixed Effects
NO
YES
NO
NO
Year Fixed Effects
NO
NO
YES
NO
Adjusted R2
0.089
0.186
0.147
0.089

measured in its own currency. Hypothesis 2 predicts that the regression coefficient of
IT*AGE (cd0) is negative. In other words, the negative and convex relation between M/B
ratio and firm age is stronger (i.e., speed of learning and its impact on valuation is faster)
after the enforcement of insider trading laws.
Table 3 shows the results of this analysis. There are 39,231 firms with valid data
for all variables in the final sample. All t-statistics reported in parentheses for Model 4
are based on clustered standard errors. Panel A is based on a full data set whereas Panel B
represents data sample without US firms, Panel C shows results for a sample of countries
that experience change in Insider Trading law enforcement over the sample period from
1981 to 2012. Model 1 is the basic OLS regression model with heteroscedasticityconsistent standard errors. Models 2 and 3 include country and year fixed effects
respectively. In Model 4, standard errors are clustered by firm.
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The coefficients of variable IT only capture the level of valuations and are not
related to the learning model because the learning model requires an interaction of the
learning environment variables with the firm’s age. We observe that insider trading law
enforcement has a positive effect on valuation in general. The negative coefficient on
AGE variable in every panel establishes the inverse and convex relation between a firm’s
M/B and its age. However, to assess the impact of IT law enforcement on the speed of
learning and change in M/B stipulated in hypothesis 2, we turn our attention to the
coefficients in the second row of every panel. Negative coefficients on IT*AGE represent
faster speed according to the learning model. Consistent with our hypothesis, there is a
negative coefficient on enforcement of insider trading which suggests that this feature
speeds up the learning process. Looking at Model4, when all countries are considered, we
find the negative coefficient of -0.542 (with t-statistic of -4.19). The results are stronger
when we exclude US observations to verify the relevance of our study in present times;
the US started enforcing the insider trading law decades ago in 1961. The strongest
results are obtained when we consider only countries which experience a regime change
from no enforcement to strict enforcement of insider trading laws within our sample
period from 1981 to 2012 onwards12. The regression coefficient is reported as -0.945
(with t-statistic of -7.02). In addition, the results for a sample of US firms also confirm
our hypothesis of a faster speed of learning when insider trading laws are enforced13. The
regression coefficient is equal to -0.712 (with t-statistic of -2.59). The overall conclusion

12

We perform the robustness check by restricting the sample to ten years before and ten
years after the enforcement years. The results still hold. We do not report these results for brevity
but they are available on request.
13

Results are not included in the table but are available per request.
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from the table confirms that the enforcement of insider trading laws enhances the speed
with which stock price valuation reaches its convex equilibrium in the context of the
learning model14.
To further confirm the impact of insider trading law enforcement on valuation
convexity, we conduct a country-by-country analysis. The results of this analysis are
presented in Table 4. The table reports the changes in the speed of learning and change in
M/B ratio for 34 countries in the world that had the change in active enforcement of
insider trading laws implemented in each country. Again, our variable of interest is
IT*AGE which assesses the impact of insider trading law enforcement on the speed of
learning and change in M/B ratio stipulated in hypothesis 2. Negative coefficients on
IT*AGE variable represent faster speed according to the learning model. We use the
following basic multivariate model with clustered standard errors:
log(M/B)i,t = b0 + b1.IT.AGEi,t + b2.ITi,t + b3.AGEi,t + εi,t

(5)

where variables are similar to those defined in equations 5 and 6. The results in Table 4
show that the average speed with which stock price valuation reaches its convex
equilibrium in the context of the learning model is enhanced when insider trading laws
are enforced. The average change is -0.574 (with a t-statistic of -2.37). We also show,
that 70.6% of countries in our sample exhibit faster achievement of M/B ratio’s convex
equilibrium when insider trading laws are actively enforced.

14

As an alternative specification, we simply add the term IT and IT*AGE to equation
without all of the interaction terms to test the incremental effect of insider trading law
enforcement and achieve the results with same quality as presented in this section. The numbers
are not reported here but available on request.
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Table 4
Country-by- country analysis of impact of insider trading law enforcement on
learning and valuation
This table reports the changes in the speed of learning and change in M/B ratio for 34
countries in the world after the active enforcement of insider trading laws. Variable
IT*AGE assesses the impact of IT law enforcement on the speed of learning and change
in M/B stipulated in hypothesis 2. Negative coefficients on IT*AGE represent faster
speed according to the learning model.
The basic model used is log(M/B)i,t = b0 + b1.IT.AGEi,t + b2.ITi,t + b3.AGEi,t + εi,t
All standard errors were clustered by firm.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Country
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Chile
China
Denmark
Finland
Germany
Greece
Hong Kong
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Malaysia
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Pakistan
Philippines
Portugal
Russia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Thailand
Turkey

IT*AGE
-0.044
-0.2146
-1.918
-0.318
-0.338
-0.497
-1.666
1.096
-0.72
-2.85
-2.413
2.287
0.715
1.187
-1.041
-1.837
-2.068
1.028
-0.303
-0.662
-0.737
1.123
1.03
0.043
1.416
0.399
-4.244
-0.832
-0.393
-2.838
-1.478
-0.512
-1.428
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Table 4
Country-by- country analysis of impact of insider trading law enforcement on
learning and valuation
Country
IT*AGE
United States
-0.486
34
Average Change
(t-statistic)
Proportion of countries that
experience faster change

-0.574
(-2.37)**
70.6 %

Learning, Analyst Forecast Errors, and Crash Risk
To establish the economic implication of learning in firm valuation, we study the
period of financial crisis and determine whether there is a relation between accuracy of
analyst forecasts, the speed of learning and the probability of a crash in firm’s stock
price. The importance of fair valuation is highlighted by recurrence of bubbles and
crashes in the financial markets. Investor learning, investor sentiment and analyst forecast
errors significantly affect stock valuation (see, e.g., Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998).
To the extent that improved learning environment and accurate analyst forecasts lead to
fair valuations, they should reduce the occurrence of financial bubbles and crises.
Specifically, slower learning and slower reduction of analyst forecast errors (with the
progression in the firm’s age) should increase the probability of crashes.
Firm-specific and country-specific information on the frequency of crash, analyst
forecast errors, firm age, and control variables are obtained from I/B/E/S and Datastream
International databases. We retrieve daily prices of stocks from 50 counties around the
world during the period of 2008 and 2009 from Datastream International. Stocks that
begin trading after 2007 are excluded from our analysis. We follow the methods from
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Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009) to calculate the frequency of crash as a proxy for
the probability of crash. The computation is based on the number of the firm-specific
daily residual returns that is 3.09 standard deviations or more below its mean value. To
estimate the residuals we obtain daily values of market index for each of the 50 countries
in the sample.15 Firm-specific daily residual returns are calculated as natural log of one
plus the residual return which is estimated from a regression model:
ri,t= a + b.Rm,t + εi,t

(6)

where ri,t represents a return of stock i on day t, and Rm,t represents country-specific
market index on day t16.
We show that better learning about firm’s profitability/prospect reduces the crash
probability. We define the degree of learning as the magnitude of reduction in analyst
forecast errors as a firm matures. We approximate the degree of learning by the
correlation between analyst forecast errors and firm’s age in all years prior to the period
of financial crisis. Just like analyst errors are an inverse measure of learning, this
correlation measure is also an inverse measure of learning with higher numbers indicating
slower learning and more negative numbers indicating faster learning. We define crash
indicator variable (CRASH) as a measure of the probability that a firm crashes within a
specified period of the financial crisis. CRASH is equal to one for a firm if there are five
or more firm-specific daily residual returns that fall 3.09 standard deviations below the

15

Zimbabwe is excluded from this analysis due to the lack of data on daily market index
available from Datastream International.
16

Firm-specific daily residual for the years 2008-2009 were computed to define the crash
events. We plotted the number of crash events for ten portfolios of stocks sorted by their average
analyst forecast errors in the years preceding the crash. That plot showed preliminary evidence
consistent with our conjecture that higher analyst forecast errors increase the probability of crash
risk. The figure is not reported here but is available per request.
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mean daily firm-specific residual returns for the period (fiscal year period for Crash 2008
and two years for Crash 2008-2009). We choose five days to approximate one trading
week period. Firm-specific daily residual returns are calculated based on two different
estimation periods of financial crisis- year 2008 and years 2008-2009 for regressions.
Taking into consideration that our dependent variable CRASH is a binary variable, we
estimate the following logit regression model, based on the cross-sectional data, to
determine the effect of learning on the probability that an individual stock would crash
during the financial crisis period:
CRASHi, = a + b.AFE_AGEi + c.SIZEi,t-1 + d.LEVi,t-1 + e.ROEi,t + εi

(7)

where AFE_AGEi is a proxy for learning for each firm i and is calculated as a
correlation value between analyst forecast error and firm’s age prior to the financial
crisis period. AGE is defined as -1/(1+Firm’s Age). SIZEi,t-1 is defined as the natural
log of the firm’s total assets before the financial crisis period. LEVi, t-1 is a firm’s debt
ratio before the financial crisis period. ROEi,t is defined as firm’s return on equity.
Panel A in Table 5 shows the results of the analysis. There are a total of 14,537
firms with valid data for all of the variables in the final sample. For each coefficient
we report p-value associated with Wald Chi-square statistic. The rows for Crash 2008
and Crash 2008-2009 represent the two alternative specifications of the sample periods
based on which CRASH is estimated.
The coefficient on variable AFE_AGE is positive and statistically significant for
all specifications, indicating that the lower the magnitude of learning prior to financial
crisis the higher the log probability of crash for the stock. For example the AFE_AGE
coefficient has a value of 0.243 (with p-value of Chi-square of less than 0.0001) for the
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crash specification based on 2008 values indicating that for one unit decrease in learning
prior to financial crisis, the odds ratio of crash occurring (versus no crash occurring)
increases by a factor of 1.275. Our analysis also indicates that the log probability of
crash reduces with firm’s size as indicated by a negative and significant coefficient on
SIZEt-1. One unit increase in firm’s size reduces the odds ratio of crash probability by a
factor of 0.869 for 2008 specification of crash.17
Panel B in Table 5 shows the results of the analysis based on the sample that
excludes US firms. We want to show that our results are not necessarily driven by the
companies located in the United States. The coefficient on variable AFE_AGE is still
positive and statistically significant for all specifications, indicating that the lower the
magnitude of learning prior to financial crisis the higher the log probability of crash for
the international stocks as well. For example the AFE_AGE coefficient has a value of
0.185 (with p-value of Chi-square of less than 0.0001) for the crash specification based
on 2008 values indicating that for one unit decrease in learning prior to financial crisis,
the odds ratio of crash occurring (versus no crash occurring) increases by a factor of
1.204. The coefficient for AFE_AGE for the crash specification based on 2008-2009 is
also positive and statistically significant.
Overall the results in Table 5 support our conjecture that higher analyst errors
resulting from poor learning increases the probability of a stock price crash risk.

17

Also, the logit regression model was estimated to determine the effect of analyst
forecast accuracy on the probability that the stock crashes: CRASHi, = a + b.MEAN_AFEi +
c.SIZEi,t-1 + d.LEVERAGEi,t-1 + e.ROEi,t + εi where MEAN_AFE represents mean value of
analyst forecast error for each firm i for all years before the financial crisis period of 2008-2009.
Analyst forecast error (AFE) for each year is defined as the absolute difference between median
forecasted EPS and the actually reported EPS, scaled by the year-end stock price. We confirm
that one unit increase in average analyst forecast error (low accuracy of forecast) prior to
financial crisis leads to increased log probability of crash for the stock.

32

Table 5
Analyst errors, slow learning and probability of crash
Frequency of crash is calculated in two alternative specifications based on the crisis year
2008 (Crash 2008) and two year crisis period of 2008 and 2009 (Crash 2008-2009). We
closely follow methods from Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009) to calculate
probability of crash which is based on the number of the firm-specific daily residual
returns that is 3.09 standard deviations or more below its mean value. The indicator
variable CRASH is set equal to 1 for a firm if there are five or more firm-specific daily
residual returns that fall 3.09 standard deviations below the mean daily firm-specific
residual returns for the period (fiscal year period for Crash 2008 and two years for Crash
2008-2009). Five days approximate one trading week period. Firm-specific daily residual
returns are calculated as natural log of one plus the residual return which, in turn, is
estimated from a regression model ri,t= a+b.Rm,t+ εi,t where ri,t represents a return of stock
i on day t, and Rm,t represents country-specific market index on day t.
In Panels A and B, a logit regression model is used to estimate the impact of learning on
crash probability. We specifically model the probability of crash rather than “no crash.”
CRASHi, = a + b.AFE_AGEi + c.SIZEi,t-1 + d.LEVi,t-1 + e.ROEi,t + εi,
where AFE_AGEi is a proxy for learning and is calculated as a correlation value between
analyst forecast error and firm’s age prior to the financial crisis period. AGE is defined as
in Table 2 above.
p-values associated with Wald Chi-square statistic are reported in parenthesis below each
coefficient’s estimate.
Panel A Impact of learning on probability of crash for all firms
AFE_AGEi SIZEt-1
LEVt-1
ROEi,t
#
Firms
Coefficient
-0.141
-0.148
-0.00004 14,537
Crash 2008
0.243
p-value
(0.00)
(0.46)
(0.48)
(0.00)
Δ Odds0.869
0.862
1.000
1.275
Ratio
Coefficient
-0.096
-0.013
0.00001
0.145
p-value
(0.00)
(0.87)
(0.62)
(0.00)
Δ Odds0.908
0.987
1.000
1.156
Ratio
Panel B Impact of learning on probability of crash, excluding US firms
Coefficient
-0.160
-0.340
-0.00015
Crash 2008
0.185
p-value
(0.00)
(0.17)
(0.18)
(0.00)
Δ Odds0.852
0.712
1.000
1.204
Ratio
-0.108
-0.294
-0.00011
Crash 2008- Coefficient
0.163
p-value
(0.00)
(0.02)
(.24)
2009
(0.00)
Δ Odds0.897
0.745
1.000
1.177
Ratio
Crash 20082009
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14,537

11,214

11,214

Insider Trading Law Enforcement, Analyst Forecast Errors, and Crash Risk
This section of the paper incorporates an econometric method that is used to solve
the endogeneity problem when it comes to establishing the implication of insider trading
law enforcement in firm valuation. We use a traditional instrumental variable approach
with the two stage least squares (2SLS) estimator to address this relation. We want to
determine whether there is a relation between accuracy of analyst forecasts and the
probability of a crash in firm’s stock price. We use several variables as instruments for
analyst forecast errors: enforcement of insider trading laws, number of analysts following
a stock, a loss variable indicating a negative forecasted EPS, and firm’s age to obtain the
exogenous component of analyst forecast errors. Our simple model for the probability of
a crash in firm’s stock price is as follows:
CRASHi = a + b.AFEi + εi

(8)

where, AFE is an average analyst forecast error (defined as in previous equations) before
the financial crisis period for a particular firm i. However, to avoid possible endogeneity
problem and to establish a connection between the concept of insider trading law
enforcement as a catalyst for better learning among analysts, we pick several instruments
to represent analyst forecast errors. The first stage regression of 2SLS is as follows:
AFEi,t = p0 + p1.ITi,t + p2.NUMESTi,t + p3.LOSSi,t + p4.AGEi,t + ui,t

(9)

where all of the variables are defined as in Equation (3).
There are two important conditions that have to be met in order for the above
variables to serve as instruments for analyst forecast errors. First, are these variables
relevant? Previous literature suggests that firms’ disclosure practices and accounting
standards affect analyst forecast errors (Hope, 2003), the number of analysts following
the stock increases accuracy of forecasts (Brown, 1997), analysts’ pessimism may be

34

affecting forecast error (Gu and Wu, 2003), and as we have previously indicated, forecast
accuracy may be associated with the age of the firm. In addition, the following
correlation matrix presented in Table 6 Panel A has been obtained. It is clear that all three
variables are highly significantly correlated with analyst forecast errors as indicated by
the p-values. To further confirm the strength of our instrumental variables for a single
endogenous regressor, we find that in the first stage regression, the F-statistic for testing
the joint null hypothesis that the coefficients on the instruments are all zero is equal to
986, which is highly acceptable18. Second, our instrumental variables have to be
exogenous to the probability of a crash in firm’s stock price. We argue that enforcement
of insider trading laws is exogenous as it is based on the legal system in the particular
country which was established over many years of history and brought through, by an
outside factor. We further argue that number of analysts following a stock, a loss
variable, and firm’s age are correlated with the crash of firm’s stock price only through
average analyst forecast error prior to a period of the financial crisis.
Assuming that enforcement of insider trading laws, number of analysts following
a stock, a loss variable indicating a negative forecasted EPS, and firm’s age are proper
instruments for analyst forecast error, we test whether the exogenous part of this variable
explains variations in the probability that a firm’s stock price crashes. The results are
presented in Panels B and C of Table 6.
The results in Table 6 Panel C indicate that there is indeed a statistically
significant relation between the exogenous part of analyst forecast error and the
probability of a crash in firm’s stock price. The results hold for both alternative
18

The acceptable cutoff for F-statistic is based on asymptotic bias of the 2SLSand is
typically equal to 10. For example, see Staiger and Stock (1997).
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Table 6
Insider trading enforcement, analyst forecast errors and probability of crash
The 2SLS procedure is used:
1st stage: AFEi,t = p0 + p1.ITi,t + p2.NUMESTi,t + p3.LOSSi,t + p4.AGEi,t + ui,t
2nd stage: CRASHi = a + b.ÂFEi + εi
Variables AFE, IT, NUMEST, LOSS, and AGE are defined as in Table 2 above.
Frequency of crash is calculated in two alternative specifications based on the crisis year
2008 (Crash 2008) and two year crisis period of 2008 and 2009 (Crash 2008-2009). We
closely follow methods from Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009) to calculate
probability of crash which is based on the number of the firm-specific daily residual
returns that is 3.09 standard deviations or more below its mean value. The indicator
variable CRASH is set equal to 1 for a firm if there are five or more firm-specific daily
residual returns that fall 3.09 standard deviations below the mean daily firm-specific
residual returns for the period (fiscal year period for Crash 2008 and two years for Crash
2008-2009). Five days approximate one trading week period. Firm-specific daily residual
returns are calculated as natural log of one plus the residual return which, in turn, is
estimated from a regression model ri,t= a+b.Rm,t+ εi,t where ri,t represents a return of
stock i on day t, and Rm,t represents country-specific market index on day t.
We specifically model the probability of crash rather than “no crash.”
Panel A Pearson correlation coefficients for instrumental variables. Dependent variable
is AFE
IT
NUMEST
LOSS
AGE
Coefficient
-0.044
-0.097
0.151
-0.033
p-value
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
Panel B First stage of the 2SLS procedure. Results of the OLS regression model.
Dependent variable is AFE
IT
NUMEST
LOSS
AGE
Coefficient
-0.033
-0.002
0.076
-0.003
t-stat
(-17.25)
(-27.08)
(50.86)
(-0.63)
Adjusted R2
0.032
Panel C Second stage of the 2SLS procedure. Results of the OLS regression model.
Dependent variable is CRASH
Crash 2008
Crash 2008-2009
AFE_hat
AFE_hat
Coefficient
0.382
0.421
t-stat
5.14
2.99
Adjusted R2
0.0014
0.0004
Panel D Bootstrapping of estimates from the second stage of 2SLS procedure. Dependent
variable is Crash 2008-2009
Number of
10
20
100
500
Replicates
Bias
0.0015
0.0194
-0.0053
0.0008
95% CI
(0.092, 0.750)
(0.153, 0.689)
(0.145, 0.698)
(0.144, 0.698)
t-stat
2.89
3.29
3.02
2.99
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definitions of CRASH, Crash 2008 and Crash 2008-2009. We find that higher analyst
forecast errors (as instrumented through no enforcement of insider trading, low number
of analyst following the stock, negative forecasted EPS, and young age of the firm) leads
to higher probability that a firm’s stock price crashes during the financial crisis period19.
Again, we confirm that better learning by analysts when insider trading laws are enforced
leads to lower probability of crash of a firm’s stock.
Because the 2SLS procedure is done in a step-by-step fashion, it is necessary to
adjust the standard errors of the second stage regression since they are biased. We use a
bootstrapping technique20 (repeated resampling of data) to adjust for bias in standard
errors21. Results of this analysis are provided in Panel D of Table 6. Confidence intervals
are created using a normal distribution theory. Using different amounts of replications,
10, 20, 100, and 500, we find that standard errors remain highly statistically significant
even when adjusted for bias.
Evidence of the Valuation Implication in a Multivariate Setting Conditional on
Regulatory Infrastructure
Finally, we expect to see the more pronounced improvement of learning and stock
valuation equilibrium as a result of insider trading law enforcement in countries with
better regulatory infrastructure. We measure the quality of regulatory infrastructure based
on four aspects of World Bank’s World Governance Indicator (WGI) index developed by
19

We obtain results that are in the same general direction for the second stage of the
2SLS procedure when we use a logit regression model to estimate the impact of learning on crash
probability for both definitions of CRASH variable.
20

See http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/sas/faq/bootstrap.htm

21

When bootstrapping technique is used, two assumptions about the data have to be
made. First, observations in the dataset are independent. Second, estimated statistic is
asymptotically normally distributed.
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Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011). The four aspects include government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. Each indicator
ranges in value from -2.5 (weak governance performance) to 2.5 (strong governance
performance). We find a value for each one of these indicators for each country by
averaging the estimates provided by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi from year 1996 to
2011. To calculate the index we add the values for each indicator for each country.
Constructed index can range in value from -10 to 10. Each country is then considered to
have “good” (“bad”) quality of regulatory infrastructure if the value of the index for that
particular country is above (below) the average index value based on all of the countries
in the sample. In our sample of countries, Denmark has the highest value of WGI index
of 8.33 and Zimbabwe has the lowest value of -5.60. The details of WGI index values for
each country are available in Table A1 of Appendix. Empirical results in Table 7 confirm
our conjecture. The negative IT*AGE coefficients are stronger for countries with above
average WGI scores. For example, based on all countries sample, the IT*AGE
coefficients for countries with above average WGI scores is -0.874 and statistically
significant (with t-statistic of -5.25). The coefficient for countries with below average
WGI scores is statistically insignificant. The results are even stronger when we focus on
only countries which experience changes in IT law enforcement from 1981 onwards.
Robustness Tests
We conduct several robustness checks to establish the reliability of our results and
investigate the extent to which our findings can be generalized22. Earlier in Table 1, we

22

Robustness tables are not included in the manuscript for brevity but will be available
from the authors or from the data section of the journal website, if this facility is provided .
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Table 7
Incremental effect regression: Impact of insider trading law enforcement on
learning and valuation, conditional on regulatory infrastructure
World Governance Indicators index was obtained/calculated based on the four factors
such as Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of
Corruption. Values for each factor are averages based on country-year values from
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011).
The interactive variable specification follows the methods of He and Ng (1998):
log(M/B)i,t = c0 + cd0IT.AGEi,t + cd1ITi,t + cd2IT.DIVi,t + cd3IT.LEVi,t + cd4IT.SIZEi,t
+ cd5IT.ROEi,t + cd6IT.ROE(1)i,t + cd7IT.ROE(2)i,t + cd8IT.ROE(3)i,t
+ cd9IT.RET(1)i,t + cd10IT.RET(2)i,t + cd11IT.RET(3)i,t + c1AGEi,t + c2DDi,t
+ c3LEVi,t + c4SIZEi,t + c5ROEi,t + c6ROE(1)i,t + c7ROE(2)i,t
+ c8ROE(3)i,t + c9RET(1)i,t + c10RET(2)i,t + c11RET(3)i,t + εi,t
where AGE and other base variables retain their definitions from Table 3 and
interactive variables are obtained by multiplying the value of Environment variable
with the base variable. IT is indicator variable for Insider Trading law enforcement.
For example, IT equals one if insider trading law is enforced in a given country in a
given year and zero otherwise and then that value is assigned to all applicable firmyear observations. All variables of firms in a given country are measured in its own
currency. For brevity, we report only three regression coefficients IT*AGE, AGE, and
IT. All t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on clustered standard errors.
Panel A: There are 21,767 firms with valid observations.
Panel B: There are 16,672 firms with valid observations.
Panel C: There are 10,990 firms with valid observations
IT*AGE
IT
AGE
R2
Panel A All countries
Countries with above average WGI
Insider trading law enforced
1.323
0.266
.07
-0.874
(16.30)
(1.63)
(-5.25)
Countries with below average WGI
Insider trading law enforced
-0.370
-1.456
0.11
0.057
(-2.65)
(-6.86)
(0.26)
Panel B All countries. Excluding USA data
Countries with above average WGI
Insider trading law enforced
1.139
0.266
0.09
-1.174
(14.02)
(1.63)
(-6.99)
Countries with below average WGI
Insider trading law enforced
-0.370
-1.456
0.11
0.057
(-2.65)
(-6.86)
(0.26)
Panel C Countries with change in Insider Trading law enforcement
Countries with above average WGI
Insider trading law enforced
1.049
0.303
0.09
-1.293
(13.01)
(1.85)
(-7.46)
Countries with above average WGI
Insider trading law enforced
-0.471
-1.372
0.12
-0.124
(-3.50)
(-5.94)
(-0.52)
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showed that the decline in analyst forecast errors with the advancement in the firm’s age
is pervasive across markets and countries. As the first robustness test, we divide our
sample into various sub-samples focusing on the time-period dimension. Median analyst
forecast error for the overall sample in Table 1 for one year old firms is significantly
higher than the median analyst forecast error for ten year old firms in both 1981-1996 and
1997-2012 sub-samples. Similar results are obtained in three sub-samples which are
formed before the world financial crisis (1981-2002), during the world financial crisis
period (2003-2009), and after the end of the financial crisis (2010-2012).
The survivorship bias in our analysis is minimized as we also include dead and
delisted stocks in our sample. However the patterns of learning and its valuation
implications are robust to exclusion of these stocks. Previous versions of the study were
based on these samples; we don’t include the tables now for brevity but results are
available on request. Additionally, the regression results reported in the tables as based
on firm-level clustering of errors. We also crosscheck the results in our analysis by
applying country-level clustering instead of firm-level clustering whenever applicable.
The results continue to hold at the conventional level of significance. All of our main
conclusions are based on heteroskedasticty consistent White standard errors; they are also
robust to alternative regression techniques such as year and country fixed effects.
Although most of our analysis is theoretically unaffected by currency exchange
rates because scaled analyst errors or valuation ratios do not have any currency units, we
verify that the results are in the same direction when we use dollar denominated variables
as input as they are when we use local currency denominated variables.
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CONCLUSION
Global investors face significant uncertainty about profitability and cash flows of
emerging firms. While these uncertainties are supposed to be typically resolved through
time (see e.g. Pastor and Veronesi ,2003), we argue further that variations in legal
tradition and institutional settings in different countries can alter the efficiency of such
dynamics. This aspect is largely ignored in literature. The main contribution of this paper
is to provide the first evidence of the impact of insider trading laws enforcement on the
learning process among stock market participants.
We start by showing that learning plays a critical role in the stock price discovery
process worldwide. Consistent with learning curve, earnings forecast errors on 37,870
firms in our global sample generally reduce faster in the first several years and stabilize
with the age of a firm. The economic implication of this phenomenon is also evident. In
cross-section, the probability of stock price crash during the 2008-2009 financial crisis
period is significantly higher for firms with more severe analyst forecast errors and
slower speed of learning before the crisis. Consistent with Pastor and Veronesi (2003)
theoretical model, market-to-book ratios of companies in 51 countries also reduce in time
with convexity.
Importantly, we then extend the concept of speed of learning beyond firm-specific
characteristics. Our focus is on the ‘active’ enforcement of insider trading laws, which is
aimed to enhance better investor protection in a given capital market. Our empirical
results indicate that enforcement of laws prohibiting insider trading speeds up the rate of
decline of analyst forecast errors with progression in a firm’s age, and consequently firms
are valued at their long run equilibrium values more quickly. Thus, the incentives for
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outside analysts to generate profitable information through research outweigh any
information losses from disallowing corporate insiders from interfering with the price
discovery process. To the extent that equilibrium stock prices can provide some
immunity against stock market bubbles and crashes, regulators initiatives regarding
enactment of laws prohibiting insider trading and strict enforcement of those laws with
swift prosecutions have the additional value of improving the learning environment and
stability in the financial markets. Our results also point out to the necessity of a strong
overall regulatory infrastructure in facilitating the effectiveness of insider trading laws in
a capital market. Our study relates to Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) who show that price
informativeness improves in developed countries with enforcement of insider trading
laws; however, we investigate the concept of learning by analysts and we show that
learning improves, and hence convex valuation of a particular stock is achieved faster
with active enforcement of insider trading laws, and as a result probability of a crash is
reduced.
Future research can explore the impact of additional legal/institutional settings
(e.g. short sale restrictions, foreign versus local investors’ dominance, among others) on
investor learning. The overall results in this paper also implore that stock price
discovery/informativeness literature include the learning curve as an important aspect.
Lastly, the enforcement of insider trading laws and learning process about a firm’s
profitability has important implications for stock valuation and financial market stability
all around the world.

42

CHAPTER 3
GATED COMMUNITY PREMIUMS AND AMENITY DIFFERENTIALS IN
RESIDENTIAL SUBDIVISIONS

1. Introduction
Gated communities are residential developments characterized by physical
security measures such as gates, walls, guards and closed-circuit television cameras. A
common feature is a perimeter wall/fence enclosing the entire development; where,
vehicular access is usually restricted by a gate, controlled by access cards, PIN codes,
remote controls or security personnel. Security within the community is provided by
various means, including 24-hour security guard patrols, ‘back-to-base’ alarm systems
and panic buttons, closed-circuit television cameras, guard dogs, electric fencing, spikes
and other forms of anti-intruder perimeter control systems.
Gated communities and residents’ associations are not just an American
phenomenon, gated communities have experienced growth in Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
China, France, Russia, Serbia and the U.K;1 however, approximately 65,700,000
Americans reside in association-governed communities, including homeowners
associations, gated communities, planned unit developments, condominiums, and
cooperatives.2 According to American Housing Survey (2009), there were 10,759,000

1

See Webster, C., G. Glasze, and K. Frantz (2002), Wu and Webber (2004), Atkinson
and Flint (2004), Blinnikov et al. (2006), Maher (2006), Sabatini and Salcedo (2007), and Hirt
and Petrovic (2011).
2

Community Association Institute (2013). See also
http://www.cairf.org/research/factbook/2013_statistical_review.pdf
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units located in communities whose access is secured with walls, gates or fences.3 In the
United States, gated communities have grown to the point where such developments now
account for roughly 11 per cent of all new housing.4 It is generally concluded that gated
communities transpire out of fear, anxiety, and insecurity of urban inhabitants. Other
factors may include economic restructuring, global terrorism, crime, immigration, the
privatization of public services and a perceived undermining of democratic processes.
Thus, to protect themselves from these perceived risks and uncertainties, homeowners
may desire to create a buffer between themselves and their families and society at large.
We temporally examine the existence of price premiums for a sample of single
family homes in private, gated residential communities relative to values in comparable
non-gated communities in Memphis and Shelby County, Tennessee. Each gated
community is matched with a control sample of similar non-gated properties in
geographically adjacent or close proximity communities. Non-gated communities are also
matched with gated communities based on average sale price, total living area, total lot
area, and age.
We obtain housing sales data from the Shelby County, TN Assessor’s Office for a
sample period from 2000 through 2012, and apply hedonic modeling similar to that used
in a number of prior studies including Spahr and Sunderman (2009), Sunderman and
Spahr (2004, 2006), Sunderman and Birch (2002), and Asabere and Huffman (1991)
consider modifications suggested by Sirmans, MacPherson, and Zietz (2005).

3

U.S. Census Bureau, Current Housing Reports, Series H150/09, American Housing
Survey for the United States: 2009, September 2010. See also
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/nationaldata.html
4

See, for example, Atkinson and Blandy (2005), Blandy, Lister, Atkinson and Flint,
(2003), McKenzie, (1994), and Blakely and Snyder, (1997).
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We posit that our findings may be applicable to other locations in the United
States because of the ethnic, racial and economic diversity of our sample. Our results are
consistent with those obtained by LaCour-Little and Malpezzi (2009) and Helsley and
Strange (1999).
We add to the literature in a number of ways. We apply hedonic valuation models
to control for and value unique, distinctive aspects of individual property and community
specific amenities such as club houses, community swimming pools, tennis courts, guard
buildings, etc., associated with both gated and non-gated communities. While controlling
for unique property attributes, we find that single family homes in gated communities
generally command statistically significant higher prices relative to comparable nongated communities. Also, we study the influence of relative gated community size on
price premiums, finding that size impacts average property values. Medium size gated
communities appear to carry the highest price premium as compared to smaller and larger
gated communities. We also find that more affluent (higher priced) gated communities
command statistically significant, higher gate premiums than do less affluent (lower
priced) gated communities. Gates and access controls appear to be more highly valued by
buyers in more affluent communities.
Additionally, our data period permits us to consider most of the housing cycle
from 2000-2012 allowing us to examine empirically whether gated communities
sustained price premiums before and subsequent to the 2008-2009 subprime crisis. Also,
we refine this analysis, using median sale prices for each year for each community and
the median of the median prices, to classify each gated community and its matching nongated community into either the higher priced or lower priced group. We find that higher
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priced and lower priced gated communities retained values differently before and after
the financial crisis period. Prior to the crisis, higher priced gated communities carried
significant price premiums over comparable non-gated communities; whereas, evidence
of price premiums is mixed for lower priced gated communities. Subsequent to the crisis,
however, we find that neither higher priced nor lower priced gated communities
command statistically significant price premiums over their matching non-gated
counterparts.
Section 2 describes the review of the literature, Section 3 presents data and
methodology, Section 4 discusses results and robustness tests and Section 5 concludes.
2. Review of the Literature
Given the relatively recent proliferation of gated communities in Shelby County,
TN as well as in the United States, we study the motivation behind both the increase in
gated communities and whether there are significant economic components associated
with them.
LaCour-Little and Malpezzi (2009) find that price premiums associated with
properties in gated communities result from net tradeoffs among positive benefits and
higher infrastructure costs. Helsey and Strange (1999), using a microeconomic approach,
attribute price premiums to reduced crime levels in gated communities relative to nongated communities. In addition to safety considerations, we use hedonic modeling (a
valuation/pricing approach) to quantify net specific tradeoffs between identified benefits
and costs as justification for price premiums.
Homeowners within gated communities typically own undivided interests in
streets and sidewalks in addition to fee simple land ownership on which their homes sit
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(see LaCour-Little and Malpezzi, 2009). Homeowners associations generally manage the
streets, sidewalks and common areas, where regular and occasional assessments may be
imposed on property owners to fund maintenance. As compensation for added costs,
residents of gated communities gain control of the streets, thereby restricting access,
reducing traffic, noise and possibly crime. Thus, despite additional costs associated with
living in gated communities, the benefits outweigh the additional ownership costs if value
premiums exist.
LaCour-Little and Malpezzi (2009) and Bible and Hsieh (2001) observe security
as the most common cited reason influencing gated community price premiums;
however, they also posit the existence of a number of other reasons for potential
premiums.5 The perception that a gate reduces crime within the community is best
explained by the concept of ‘defensible space’ credited to Newman (1973, 1980, 1992,
1995). Newman initially studies the incidence of crime in gated communities located
very near a high crime housing project in St. Louis and finds that they experienced lower
crime and full occupancy throughout the study period. Based on data from the American
Housing Survey for fee-paying gated and non-gated neighborhoods, Chapman and
Lombard (2006) find that neighborhood resident satisfaction levels strongly depend on
the perception of a lack of crime.
Hardin and Cheng (2003) investigate the impact of security and crime protection
afforded by gated access and look at the effect on garden apartment rents. They find that
rents are positively related to the presence of gated access constraints. Thus, not only

5

Potential benefits cited are a perception of greater safety, reduced traffic, and increased

prestige.
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home owners, but also renters are willing to pay for additional security provided by a
gate.
The value of gated property security extends beyond residential properties.
Benjamin et al. (2007), found that gated commercial properties yield rent premiums as
compared to non-gated commercial properties when controlling for other physical
characteristics and ownership-management types.
Wilson-Doenges (2000) studies gated versus non-gated communities in both high
income and low income neighborhoods in Southern California. As may be expected,
personal safety and community safety perceptions per capita are higher in the high
income gated versus non-gated community. However, perceptions of differences in crime
rates between gated and non-gated communities are not statistically significant in both
high and low income communities.
Other factors also may affect gated community price premiums. For example, it is
important to consider the impact of additional conveniences such community may offer.
Several previous studies have explored the effects of amenities, other than security, on
community real estate values. Specifically, Benefield (2009) studies packages of amenity
offerings and their impact on property values in neighborhoods. He finds that some
amenity packages positively influence property values.6 Contrary to his study, we
conclude that other amenities found within gated communities negatively impact property
values when also controlling for amenities associated with individual properties,
neighborhood size and affluence. We attribute our finding of negative values for

6

Also, Hansz and Hayunga (2012) evaluate the presence of a country club as an
additional amenity and its influence on the property values. Not so apparent amenities such as
sense of arrival, greenway connectivity, and the median length of a cul-de-sac and their positive
effects on property values are explored by Shin et al. (2011).
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community amenities, such as neighborhood swimming pools, results from many
individual properties duplicating the same amenities.
Regardless of gated community attributes such as crime reduction, perception of
increased security and other amenities, gated communities have been the target of
criticisms from academics, the media and the wider community. These criticisms
generally focus on the potential divisions within the community caused by the gated
communities. For example, Kennedy (1995) argues that residential associations
(including gated neighborhoods) carry negative externalities for nonmembers in the form
of discrimination on race and class, limiting a right to travel on private streets (raising a
possibility of harassment by security guards or police), and even reduce free speech
rights. If, however, gated communities address the fears and anxieties of homeowners by
enhancing personal safety, the security of material goods, as well as protecting homes
from unwanted intrusions, the value of these attributes may outweigh the negative
externalities and additional costs of such communities, thereby creating a price premium.
Further, the physical design and control of gated neighborhoods may assist in fostering a
sense of community and common purpose among residents (McKenzie, 1994; Lang and
Danielsen, 1997).
The valuation of properties within gated communities is the subject of several
previous studies. Most notably, Bible and Hsieh (2001) use hedonic pricing and find that
gated community properties have price premiums. We refine Bible and Hsieh’s model by
controlling for additional features possibly available within gated communities such as
clubhouses, community swimming pools, tennis courts, basketball courts and small lakes
or ponds within the gated community.
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LaCour-Little and Malpezzi (2009) further support value premiums for gated
communities while also controlling for other neighborhood attributes, such as presence of
homeowners associations7 and privately owned streets. They find that price premiums,
relative to non-gated counterparts, range from 7% to 24% for gated neighborhoods in
Southern California and 13% for gated neighborhoods in St. Louis.
Pompe (2008), also using a hedonic approach, finds that beach locations are more
highly valuable by residents of gated communities, as compared to similar non-gated
communities. Contrary to our findings, Le Goix (2007), using 1990-2000 data from
metropolitan Los Angeles, California, constructs an index of discontinuity finding that
large, high-end gated communities maintained price premiums and justify higher
governance/maintenance costs over time; whereas, less affluent gated communities
(“middle class” gated communities) did not. Also, contrary to our finding, Le Goix and
Vasselinov (2013), using data through 2008, which may not measure the full impact of
the housing crisis period, conclude that properties located within gated communities are
more immune to unexpected decrease in property values during periods of financial
distress as compared to non-gated properties. However, they found some evidence that
price premiums in gated communities had negative price effects on nearby financially
distressed non-gated community properties. They posit that the presence of gated
communities within a financially stressed neighborhood may destabilize prices of nearby
non-gated communities. We find that both higher priced and lower priced gated
7

Previous study by Hughes and Turnbull (1996) uses hedonic pricing model to find that
presence of various deed restrictions imposed by separate subdivisions (possibly HOA’s) is
positively capitalized into property values. Rogers (2010) further confirms a positive impact of
deed restrictions on housing prices while controlling for other neighborhood characteristics.
However, the author indicates that this positive impact disappears with the passage of time if
restriction is not timely updated. Lin et al. (2010) argue that a specific covenant of age restrictions
on ownership correlates with property values.
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communities failed to sustain price premiums subsequent to the 2008-2009 financial
crisis.
3. Data and Methodology
Sales data, including descriptions of single family residential properties in Shelby
County from January, 2000 through December, 2012, are obtained from the 2013
Certified Assessment Roll for Shelby County, Tennessee. The sample includes 11 fully
gated communities from several different areas of Shelby County.8 Data also include
sales from 16 comparable communities, where each gated community is matched with
non-gated communities with very similar locations and property characteristics. The
communities deemed to be comparable to gated communities are assessed based on
location (proximity to a gated community), total living area (measured in square feet),
sale price, and age of the property. The mean sale price in the lowest priced gated
community is $185,763 and the mean sale price in the highest priced gated community is
$1,315,490.
Exhibit 1 contains summary statistics for both gated and comparable non-gated
communities. Each gated community is matched with at least one comparable non-gated
community based on similar sale prices, total living areas, lot sizes and ages. In some
cases, it was possible to match with more than one comparable non-gated community.
For example, Location 7, a gated community identified as “Gated 7,” is matched with
two non-gated communities identified as “Non-gated 7a” and “Non-gated 7b” all located

8

Our initial sample of gated communities had 38 different communities. We removed
gated communities that contained zero-lot line properties since the goal of our study was to
compare single-family residential properties with sizable lots. We further reduced our sample by
removing gated communities for which we could not identify valid closely matching non-gated
communities based on location (either adjusted or in the very close proximity), price, living area,
lot land area, and age. Eleven gated communities remained in our study.
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Exhibit 1 | Descriptive Statistics for Sample Property Sales
Notes: Values represent means for each neighborhood. Gated communities Gated 2 and
Gated 2.1 and respective comparable communities are located in the same proximate
location. Age of each house was calculated as the difference between the year of sale and
the year house was built. Gated community names are provided by request.
Total Living
Land Area
Age of House
Community
Sale Price*
Area (ft2)
(ft2)
(Years)
Location 1 (loc1)
Gated 1
$229,470
2,860
9,287
1.8
Non-gated 1a
$205,297
2,888
11,217
3.4
Non-gated 1b
$293,632
3,669
17,735
3.1
Location 2 (loc2)
Gated 2
$311,738
3,435
12,685
13.1
Non-gated 2
$260,261
2,976
16,059
13.2
Gated 2.1
$382,673
3,576
13,085
6.7
Non-gated 2.1
$348,976
3,970
19,244
18.7
Location 3 (loc3)
Gated 3
$476,075
4,087
13,984
4.1
Non-gated 3a
$401,675
3,930
19,456
8.7
Non-gated 3b
$501,625
4,326
19,349
2.7
Location 4 (loc4)
Gated 4
$185,763
2,301
7,743
9.1
Non-gated 4a
$210,899
2,840
10,594
8.6
Non-gated 4b
$172,047
2,280
10,974
6.9
Location 5 (loc5)
Gated 5
$481,832
3,880.9
15,668
1.5
Non-gated 5
$382,947
3,678.4
20,996
2.0
Location 6(loc6)
Gated 6
$342,826
3,678
23,189
2.4
Non-gated 6
$251,824
3,300
20,254
32.6
Location 7 (loc7)
Gated 7
$392,528
4,061
15,202
20.6
Non-gated 7a
$312,594
3,365
18,357
16.7
Non-gated 7b
$314,546
3,255
18,344
17.4
Location 8 (loc8)
Gated 8
$494,872
4,931
37,979
9.8
Non-gated 8
$284,253
3,708
24,462
17.3
Location 9 (loc9)
Gated 9
$240,399
2,350
7,532
17.8
Non-gated 9a
$362,888
3,457
14,195
9.9
Non-gated 9b
$296,223
2,908
10,494
10.0
Location 10 (loc10)
Gated 10
$1,315,490
6,406
20,884
4.5
Non-gated 10
$675,169
5,133
31,908
22.1
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in relatively close proximity. These three locations have similar mean sale prices
($392,528, $312,594, and $314,546 respectively), as well as mean total living areas
(4,060 ft2, 3,364 ft2, and 3,225 ft2), average lot/land areas (15,201 ft2, 18,357 ft2, 18,344
ft2), and average age (20.6 years, 16.7 years, and 17.4 years).
The final data set contains 4,422 valid observations for the study period – 877
(19.83%) observations are from the gated communities. To facilitate the homogeneity of
our sample, only single-family residential properties with sizable lots are included in the
sample, thus zero-lot line properties are excluded. Valid sales include those listed as
“Land and Buildings” and classified as “Warranty Deed” (3,927 observations), “Special
Warranty Deed” (243 observations), and “Trustee Deed” (252 observations). All other
sale types and instruments of sale types are excluded from the final sample.9 The mean
property sale price in our sample for both gated and non-gated communities is $340,100.
Our sample includes data for a twelve year period from 2000-2012, allowing us to
examine the effects of the boom leading up to, the subprime mortgage crisis housing
crash and the subsequent recovery period. Following the method originally employed by
Bryan and Colwell (1982),10 we control for changing market conditions and prices

9

Given the final sample of eleven gated communities, our initial sample of residential
property sales in gated communities contained 5,927 observations. We retained only properties
with “Single Family,” “Planned Unit Development,” and “PUD Attached” land use code
designations. This resulted in a loss of 60 observations. We further delete observations that
indicate sales that are “Multiple Parcels,” “Related Parties,” “Physical Difference,” “Partial
Interest/Correction,” “Forced,” “Estate Sale,” and “Non Arms-Length Transaction,” resulting in a
loss of 831observations. We felt that these sales may not represent market value. Deeds listed as
(number of observations is in parenthesis): Cash Deed (2), Circuit Court Deed (1), Correction
Deed (6), Chancery Court Deed (2), Death Notice Deed (2), Marriage Certificate Deed (2),
Sheriff Deed (2), Quit Claim Deed (6) were also deleted. Finally, we remove 545 observations
with missing data. Our resulting data set has 4,422 observations.
10

In the Bryan and Colwell (1982) approach there is one variable to represent the
beginning of each of the years in the analysis period. The two time variables before and after the
sale date are assigned values that sum to unity, with the two values being proportionate in each

53

throughout the study period by incorporating a time (date of sale) variable. In this
method, each date of sale is defined as a linear combination of the end points of the year
in which the sale occurs. Date of sale variables, B(y), where y designates the year, are
the proportional weights assuming that each sale occurs in the middle of each month.
This technique allows the rate of change in prices to be unique for each year and allows
for a monthly price continuum. For example, if a sale occurred in September 2002, the
sale is closer to the beginning of 2003 than to the beginning of 2002; therefore, more
weight is given to B03 than to B02. As a result, the variable B02 is given a weight of
3.5/12 (or a value of .292), and B03 weighting is 8.5/12 (or a value of .708) and all other
B(y) variables have a value of zero. This technique avoids an annual step function which
would result from the use of annual date of sale variables.
Two additional criteria are used to eliminate outliers in our sales data.11 Sales are
deleted if sale price is greater than three standard errors above or below the predicted
price.12 Predictive errors may result from model misspecification, a lack of sufficiently
detailed information regarding the property and/or incorrect sales data. The second

case to the relative closeness of the sale to that year's beginning and end. They take the natural
log of each time variable, leading to an estimated price path as a point on a log linear function
that moves smoothly from the beginning of each year to the beginning of the next year. Shifts in
log linear slope occur only at the beginning of each new year. The system provides more annual
flexibility than linear or quadratic movements, being essentially an unconventional piecewise log
linear technique, with nodes at each year end within the period analyzed. Alternatively, we apply
a similar approach, but retain a linear time variable form allowing for a linear monthly price
continuum.
11

This approach was used by Spahr and Sunderman (1998), Sunderman and Birch (2002)
and Sunderman and Spahr (2006).
12

In SAS®, we use PROC REG function to determine the studentized residual
(RSTUDENT) for each observation to measure the difference between predicted values and the
observed values. Observations with absolute value studentized residuals greater than three are
removed from the regression.
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criterion eliminates any sales with unusually large absolute values for Cook’s distance
(>1.00). This indicates that the property has one or more characteristics that are quite
different from other sales, and whose presence has an unduly large influence on the
overall predicted values generated by the model.13 These additional criteria result in the
removal of 68 observations or less than 1.5% of all data.14
The data set includes numerous property characteristics for each property sale
used in the analysis. The variables in the models are defined in Exhibit 2 and selected
summary statistics for these variables are shown in Exhibit 3.
Sales price is the dependent or predicted variable in each of our hedonic models.
It is assumed that sale price is a good estimate of true market value and may be
explained/predicted by selected independent-explanatory variables. A number of
explanatory variables are generally employed when multiple regression (hedonic
modeling) is used to estimate improved residential property values. Variables include
style of building, wall construction, size, grade of construction,15 age and other property
characteristics. Additionally, we employ variables to control for other gated community

13

See Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner (1983) for a discussion of this concept.

14

Removing outliers resulted in an increase in adjusted R2 from .8973 to .9157; and all
significant variables remained significant. Eliminating sales outliers did not materially change
results; however, since the objective of the model is to estimate the value of gated communities,
we could argue that deleting the outliers improves the accuracy of the model albeit coefficients
may be biased relative to alternative coefficients estimated from the full sample.
15

We have the following categories in Quality of Construction (number of observations
are in parenthesis): Average Plus (6), Good Minus (940), Good (1,982), Good Plus (1,181), Very
good Minus (259), Very Good (20), Very Good Plus (23), Excellent (11). These measures of
quality of construction were provided in data from the 2013 Certified Assessment Roll for Shelby
County, Tennessee data.
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Variable Name
Gate
Small GC
Medium GC
Large GC
Higher Priced GC
Lower Priced GC
Additional Features GC

Full Baths
Half Baths
Lot Square Footage
Age
Number of Stories
Area of a gunite sp
Area of a vinyl sp
Area of a fiberglass sp
Area of a concrete sp
Number of fireplaces
Area of a cabana
Crawl space
Area of carport
Area of garage
Area of a stone patio
Golf
Stucco wall
Vinyl wall
Composite wall
Brick wall
Stone wall

Exhibit 2 | Independent Variables
Description
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if community Is Gated; 0
otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if gated community has
between 38 and 42 houses; 0 otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if gated community has
between 65 and 106 houses; 0 otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if gated community has
between 126 and 181 houses; 0 otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals to 1 if gated community is
“Higher Priced”; 0 otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals to 1 if gated community is
“Lower Priced”; 0 otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if gated community has either
clubhouse, swimming pool, cabana, tennis court, basketball
court, pond, or guard building; 0 otherwise
Number of full baths
Number of half baths
Total area of the property (ft2)
Age of the property; it is calculated as a difference between
“Year of Sale” and “Year Built”
Number of stories a property has
Area of a gunite swimming pool (ft2)
Area of a vinyl swimming pool (ft2)
Area of a fiberglass swimming pool (ft2)
Area of a concrete swimming pool (ft2)
Number of pre-fabricated fireplaces a property has
Area of a cabana (ft2)
Equals 1 if property has a crawl space; 0 otherwise
Area of a carport (ft2)
Area of a garage (ft2)
Area of a stone patio (ft2)
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if property has an access to the
golf course; 0 otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if exterior wall material is
stucco; 0 otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if exterior wall material is
vinyl; 0 otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if exterior wall material is
composite; 0 otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if exterior wall material is
brick; 0 otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if exterior wall material is
stone; 0 otherwise
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Variable Name
Style is Colonial
Style is English
Style is European
Style is Old Style
Style is Ranch
Style is Raised Ranch
Style is Cape Cod
Style is Contemp.
TLA
TLA * Good
TLA * Good Plus
TLA* Very Good Minus

TLA * Very Good
TLA * Best
Special warranty deed
Trustee deed
Waterfront property
b01- b13
hgb01- hgb12

hngb01- hngb12

lgb01- lgb12

Exhibit 2 | Independent Variables
Description
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if building style is colonial; 0
otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if building style is English; 0
otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if building style is European; 0
otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if building style is old style; 0
otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if building style is ranch; 0
otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if building style is raised ranch;
0 otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if building style is Cape Cod; 0
otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if building style is
contemporary; 0 otherwise
Total living area (ft2)
Total living area (ft2) multiplied by a dummy variable
representing a quality of construction that was “good”
Total living area (ft2) multiplied by a dummy variable
representing a quality of construction that was “good plus”
Total living area (ft2) multiplied by a dummy variable
representing a quality of construction that was “very good
minus”
Total living area (ft2) multiplied by a dummy variable
representing a quality of construction that was “very good”
Total living area (ft2) multiplied by a dummy variable
representing a quality of construction that was “best”
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if sale instrument is special
warranty deed; 0 otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if sale instrument is trustee
deed; 0 otherwise
Dummy Variable: Equals 1 if waterfront property; 0
otherwise
Date of sale as a linear combination of the end points of the
year in which the sale occurs
Date of sale variables in “Higher Priced” gated community
as a linear combination of the end points of the year in
which the sale occurs
Date of sale variables in “Higher Priced” non- gated
community as a linear combination of the end points of the
year in which the sale occurs
Date of sale in “Lower Priced” gated community as a linear
combination of the end points of the sale year
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Variable Name
lngb01- lngb12

loc1-loc10

Exhibit 2 | Independent Variables
Description
Date of sale variables in “Lower Priced” non- gated
community as a linear combination of the end points of the
year in which the sale occurs
Dummy variables representing a particular location of a
property

amenities that may affect property values such as presence of clubhouse, public
swimming pool, tennis court, basketball court, pond, and guard building.16 Each gated
community and its matched comparable non-gated community(ies) are assigned a unique
location variable of LOCx. These dummy variables control for each of the eleven
different locations. Our general least squares linear regression model is:
Pricei,t = α + b*Gatei,t + c*Xi,j,t + d*Date of Salei + e*Locationi + εi,t

(1)

where Pricei,t is the sale price of the property I at time t. Gatei,t is a dichotomous
(dummy) variable indicating if the community of the sale is gated (1) or not (0). Xi,j,t
represents a vector of property attributes/characteristics for property I, attribute j in
period t (age, size, number of bathrooms, etc.). Date of Salei represents linear
combinations of the end points of the year in which sale I occurs, and Locationi indicates
each property’s location.
4. Empirical Results for Hedonic Pricing Model
Referring to Exhibit 4, Model 1 represents a good fit with an adjusted R2 of
0.9157. Variance inflation factors (VIF) are run for all variables and are deemed

16

All of the gated and non-gated communities and additional amenities were carefully
investigated / matched using Google Maps®. Also, the presence of additional amenities has been
verified using the 2013 Certified Assessment Roll for Shelby County, Tennessee data.
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Exhibit 3 | Descriptive Statistics of the Full Sample
Variable Number of
Mean
Median Standard Minimum Maximum
Observations
Deviation
Price
4,422
340,100
322,000
152,287
21,000
2,403,300
(USD)
Land
Area
4,422
17,382
15,973
9,836
5,750
328,372
2
(ft )
Age
4,422
10.9
9.0
9.2
1
62
(Years)
Total
Living
4,422
3,544
3,465
847
1,675
10,860
Area
(ft2)

Number of Sales in Gated Communities
Variable
Number of Observations
Percent of Total Sample
Properties in GC’s
877
19.83
Number of Total Sales (Gated and Non-gated) by Location
Location 1
533
12.05
Location 2
472
10.67
Location 3
1,100
24.86
Location 4
501
11.33
Location 5
412
9.32
Location 6
289
6.54
Location 7
747
16.89
Location 8
169
3.82
Location 9
94
2.13
Location 10
105
2.38
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acceptable (VIF <10.0)17 reducing multicollinearity concerns among independent
variables. A dummy variable controlling for the presence of a gate measures its economic
impact on property and amenity values. Empirical results indicate that the average sale
price premium for properties located in gated communities is $29,996 relative to
comparable properties in non-gated communities. The price premium is statistically
significant at the 99 percent confidence level.18
As is the case with gated communities throughout the country, the residents of
gated communities in our study are responsible for upkeep of roads, drainage and other
maintenance that normally would be covered by the municipality for non-gated
communities, thus the $29,996 increase in value is the net increase in property values
above additional associated costs.
Other notable attributes affecting value are the lot size, where each additional
square foot is worth $0.47, and age of property, where values decline by $2,048.42 per

17

Variance inflation factors, one for each explanatory variable, measure the extent to
which variances of the estimated regression coefficients are inflated as compared to the variance
if explanatory variables were not linearly related. The largest factor among the variables is used
as the indicator of the severity of multicollinearity. For a discussion of VIF, see Neter et al.
(1983).
18

Our main model uses non-logged sale price as the dependent variable. We chose the
linear model due to its simplicity for interpretation of results. As a robustness check and check for
the presence of possible heteroscedasticity, we test several alternative models. First, we use the
natural log of the sale price as the dependent variable without logging any independent variables;
second, we use the natural log of the sale price and logged independent variables: age, square
footage of land, and square footage of living area; third, we used the non-logged sale and logged
age, square footage of land, and square footage of living area. Results of the three alternative
models are consistent with our original model: all of the variable coefficients have the same sign
and level of statistical significance. Thus, we observe no problems with heteroscedasticity or
multicollinearity (as indicated by VIF). However, we find that our original linear-linear model
provides the best fit as indicated by adjusted R-Squared. The results from the alternative models
are not reported here but are available on request.
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Exhibit 4 | Hedonic Regression Model Results
Notes: The dependent variable is the price of the property. Special Warranty Deeds and
Trustee Deeds are compared to General Warranty Deeds; all construction quality
variables are compared to average quality of construction; annual date of sale variables
(b01-b13) are compared to the base year, 2000; all siding types variables are compared to
wood siding; all house styles are compared to a traditional house style; all locations are
compared to location 8. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Adjusted R2 = 0.916
Adjusted R2 = 0.916
Adjusted R2 = 0.918
Independent
Coeff.
t-statistic
Coeff.
t-statistic
Coeff.
t-statistic
Variables
Estimate
Estimate
Estimate
Intercept
23,400
2.4**
24,058
2.5**
14,667
1.5
Gate
29,996
8.8***
Small GC
21,849
4.7***
Medium GC 33,775
9.1***
Large GC
22,068
4.2***
Higher
45,991
12.4***
Priced GC
Lower
10,103
2.6**
Priced GC
Additional
-19,534
-4.9***
-14,372
-3.1***
-14,128
-3.6***
Features
GC
Full Baths
11,686
9.4***
11,555
9.1***
11,764
9.4***
Half Baths
3,276
2.5**
3,113
2.4**
4,407
3.4***
Lot Square
0.47
5.2***
0.48
5.3***
0.59
6.5***
Footage
Age
-2,048
-14.0***
-1,989
-13.2***
-2,236
-15.3***
Number of
-5,550
-2.7***
-6,365
-3.1***
-4,542
-2.3**
Stories
Area of a
20.77
7.8***
20.38
7.7***
21.97
8.4***
gunite sp
Area of a
14.89
4.9***
14.02
4.7***
14.41
4.8***
vinyl sp
Area of a
8.47
0.97
6.76
0.8
4.38
0.5
fiberglass sp
Area of a
80.43
5.4***
81.26
5.5***
83.01
5.7***
concrete sp
Number of
1,300
1.3
1,698
1.7*
1,125
1.1
fireplaces
Area of a
73.81
4.2***
98.28
5.3***
99.02
5.4***
cabana
Crawl space 21,669
3.8***
21,871
3.9***
22,104
3.9***
Area of
49.16
4.8***
45.65
4.4***
43.66
4.3***
carport
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Area of
garage
Area of a
stone patio
Golf
Stucco wall
Vinyl wall
Composite
wall
Brick wall
Stone wall
Style is
Colonial
Style is
English
Style is
European
Style is Old
Style
Style is
Ranch
Style is
Raised
Ranch
Style is Cape
Cod
Style is
Contemp.
TLA
TLA * Good
TLA * Good
Plus
TLA * Very
Good Minus
TLA * Very
Good
TLA * Best
Special
warranty
deed
Trustee deed
Waterfront
property
b01

Exhibit 4 | Hedonic Regression Model Results
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
38.55
7.3***
37.28
7.1***
37.69
7.2***
29.80

2.0**

30.30

2.1**

31.35

2.2**

11,497
11,949
23,653
14,288

6.2***
1.8*
1.5
0.5

9,953
12,717
24,816
14,054

5.3***
1.9*
1.5
0.5

1,038
14,980
24,240
13,207

0.5
2.3**
1.5
0.5

17,043
123,720
2,576

3.0***
3.3***
0.9

17,379
117,493
2,059

3.1***
3.1***
0.7

17,387
110,930
1,192

3.1***
3.0***
0.4

6,645

1.7*

6,208

1.6

4,629

1.2

4,318

1.3

4,270

1.3

3,192

0.9

15,040

2.5**

14,850

2.5**

15,994

2.7***

2,880

0.2

3,312

0.3

-1,184

-0.1

-34,897

-2.6**

-34,864

-2.6***

-36,847

-2.7***

11,406

0.6

10,035

0.5

12,691

0.7

-25,617

-2.6**

-25,450

-2.6**

-27,002

-2.7***

44.42
6.88
15.07

24.0***
9.3***
15.9***

44.25
7.12
15.25

23.9***
9.4***
16.1***

46.48
5.45
11.38

25.3***
7.3***
11.4***

24.02

22.2***

24.31

22.5***

21.15

19.1***

55.27

24.0***

55.77

24.5***

50.95

22.0***

94.63
-65,795

47.3***
-24.8***

95.37
-65,099

47.2***
-24.7***

87.39
-65,374

42.9***
-25.0***

-54,432
34,467

-20.9***
5.3***

-53,257
36,564

-20.5***
5.6***

-54,099
19,292

-21.0***
2.9***

-3,047

-0.5

-3,580

-0.7

-4,313

-0.8
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b02
b03
b04
b05
b06
b07
b08
b09
b10
b11
b12
b13
Loc1
Loc2
Loc3
Loc4
Loc5
Loc6
Loc7
Loc9
Loc10

Exhibit 4 | Hedonic Regression Model Results
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
6,214
1.4
6,197
1.4
5,072
1.2
9,714
2.0**
8,732
1.8*
10,507
2.2**
26,510
5.7***
26,322
5.7***
26,837
5.8***
39,599
8.3***
39,079
8.3***
40,563
8.6***
63,140
13.3***
62,729
13.3***
65,119
13.8***
73,919
15.1***
73,404
15.1***
74,379
15.4***
66,766
13.0***
65,791
12.9***
69,352
13.6***
51,683
9.6***
50,455
9.4***
53,098
9.9***
31,737
5.9***
30,389
5.7***
34,582
6.5***
34,485
6.3***
33,459
6.1***
36,518
6.7***
32,915
6.0***
31,862
5.8***
34,698
6.4***
41,989
6.6***
41,792
6.6***
45,435
7.2***
-40,849
-10.0**
-40,169
-9.8***
-33,563
-8.2***
41,397
10.6***
43,813
10.8***
48,591
12.3***
55,413
14.5***
56,731
14.8***
66,452
16.8***
-26,763
-5.8***
-23,901
-5.1***
-13,712
-2.9***
22,485
5.2***
24,813
5.7***
29,532
6.8***
36,175
7.7***
37,899
7.5***
43,363
9.2***
53,354
14.5***
54,910
14.9***
56,082
15.4***
63,025
11.5***
65,163
10.9***
73,832
13.3***
177,958 26.4***
174,029
25.9***
188,667 27.8***
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year as properties age.19 This variable, however, may be somewhat misleading since the
average age of properties studied was 10.9 years and may not be representative of
property values in older Shelby County communities.
Interestingly, multi-story homes sell for less, where a multiple story house sells
for approximately $5,550 less per floor than a single story house. A poured concrete pool
has a value of $80.43 per square foot and pools of other construction have lower values.
Houses with crawlspaces rather than a concrete slab show an increased value of $21,669.
Homes with basements are not common in Shelby County due to high water tables and
concerns of flooding. Also, as expected, waterfront properties carry price premiums of
$34,467.20
Compared to General Warranty Deeds, both Special Warranty Deeds and Trustee
Deeds result in reduced sale prices of $65,795 and $54,432 respectively. Instruments of
sale other than General Warranty Deeds are considered to be inferior, thus carry a
negative sales price premium (e.g., most Trustee Deeds are associated with forced
foreclosure sales).

19

Age variable effects on value must be carefully evaluated depending on the type of real
estate. Winson-Geideman et al. (2011) study the age variable in relation to values of historic
properties demonstrating that for historic properties, age variables may turn from negative to
positive at some critical point.
20

There are several previous studies that examine effects on values of a proximity to
water. Dumm et al. (forthcoming) find that properties on bays, canals, lakes, or rivers provide
price protection through the real estate cycle. Below et al. (forthcoming) argue that land erosion
negatively affects coastal residential property values. In addition, some studies investigate the
effect of waterfront views on real estate valuation. For example, Wyman et al. (2014) study the
pricing of waterfront view amenities during different phases of the real estate cycle. They find
that prices for lower end waterfront view properties were significantly negatively affected during
the real estate downturn. Gordon et al. (2013) argue that certain type of oceanfront condominium
units may sell at premiums due to their more scenic views.
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Properties in communities, whether gated or non-gated, with a golf course sell for
$11,497 more than for communities without a golf course. These findings are consistent
with Do and Grudnitski (1995), Grudnitski (2003), and Shultz and Schmitz (2009).21
Each square foot of living area is worth $44.42 for a house with average quality of
construction. Unsurprisingly, the value of each additional square foot of living area
increases with higher quality construction. The grade of construction varies from average
(the base variable on which each higher quality of construction variable is compared) to
good, good plus, very good minus, very good and best. As expected a “good”
construction quality house sells for an additional $6.88 per square foot when compared to
a house with average quality of construction. Values for good plus, very good minus,
very good and best are $15.07, $24.02, $55.27 and $94.63, respectively. As a result, a
home built with the best quality of construction would be worth $139.05 per square foot.
Annual date of sale variables, B(y), compare market values relative to the base
year, 2000. Since Shelby County did not experience the significant run up in market
values prior to the financial crisis that were observed in other parts of the country, except
for 2001, market prices showed price increases till 2007. However, because of the excess
supply of houses on the market and the financial crisis, values began declining from a
peak in 2007 ($73,919 above the price in 2000) to a value in 2010 of only $31,737 above
2000 prices. By the end of 2012 home prices had rebounded to $41,989 above 2000
prices. To further interpret these results, previously we indicated that a sale in September
21

Do and Grudnitski (1995) find that single-family residential properties that are located
adjacent to a golf course carry a sales price premium of 7.6% as compared to houses that are not
located on a golf course. Grudnitski (2003) further investigates the value premium by golf course
type. Shultz and Schmitz (2009) study the effect of different golf courses classified based on
ownership and access characteristics on adjacent property values using GIS. They conclude that
golf courses indeed have a positive effect on value of the adjacent single-family houses.
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2002 would have a weighted value assigned to B02 of .292 and .708 to B03. Multiplying
these weights by the coefficients in Model 1 for B02 (6,213.69) and B03 (9,713.76), the
weighted average is $8,691.74. This indicates, holding all else constant, a house selling in
September of 2002 carries a price premium of $8,691.74 above one sold at the beginning
of 2000 and a price appreciation of $2,478.05 since the beginning of 2002. Price patterns
may be seen in Exhibit 7.22
Also, we control for additional amenities provided for residents of gated
communities, including the presence of a clubhouse, community swimming pool, cabana,
tennis courts, basketball courts, small ponds/lakes and for the existence of a guard
building in addition to a gate. Generally, we find that these additional amenities carry
highly significant negative values; where, the presence of additional amenities reduces
sale prices by $19,534. Although, at least superficially, these features seem to have value,
we posit that additional maintenance costs associated with these amenities outweigh their
benefits.
Location variables compare and control for price level differences among each of
the other ten gated communities and comparable communities where “Chapel Creek,” the
gated community, and its comparable “Woodchase” (Location 8) are the base
communities. See Exhibit 5 as an example of the location of Chapel Creek relative to it
matched community Woodchase. Location variables range from -$40,849 to $177,958.
For example, the variable for location 1 indicates a value of $40,849 less than Chapel
Creek; whereas, the location 10 variable shows a price level of $177,958 above Chapel
Creek.
22

The implementation of the annual date of sale variables could be used to develop a
transaction- based monthly price index.
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Exhibit 5 | Example of Gated and Non-gated Community Location
Notes: The gated “Chapel Creek” community is outlined in solid black. Comparable
community “Woodchase” has a dashed black outline.
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Other variables (attributes) may be observed in Exhibit 4.23 Overall, the hedonic
model behaves as expected and not surprisingly, the variable of specific interest in this
study, Gate, carries a significant impact on property values. Gated properties sell for
$29,996 above similar parcels in non-gated communities.
In Model 2, we introduced three separate dummy variables to capture the impact
of relative size (based on number of homes) for property values in gated communities.24
Results, shown in Exhibit 4, represent a good fit where the adjusted R2 is 0.9160, VIF
values are acceptable (VIF <10.0), and no major changes relative to Model 1 are
observed.
Model 2 finds that medium size communities carry the highest gate premium of
$33,775; whereas, gate premiums for smaller and larger communities are $21,849 and
$22,068 respectively. As in Model 1, additional amenities are negatively statistically
significant with an estimate of -$14,372. Results indicate that there may be an optimal
gated neighborhood size. This observation may be relevant for developers considering
future real estate property developments.
We posit that smaller gated communities must spread additional costs (for
example additional costs of maintaining roads, street lighting and the gate), over a lower
23

When compared to wood siding, Model 1 indicates that other siding type relative
values are (in $’s): stucco exterior wall +11,940*, vinyl exterior wall +23,653, composite exterior
wall +14,288, brick exterior wall +17,043*** and stone exterior wall +123,720***. Also, Model
1 indicates that, when compared to a traditional style house, relative values are (in $’s): colonial
+2,576, english +6,645*, european +4,318, old style +15,040**, ranch +2,879, raised ranch 34,2897**, cape cod +11,406 and contemporary -25,617***. Where ***, **, and * indicate
significance levels at 99%, 95% and 90% respectively.
24

We divide our gated community sample into three different size groupings. Small
Gated Community variable is assigned a value of 1 if gated community has between 38 and 42
houses, and 0 otherwise. Medium Gated Community variable is assigned a value of 1 if gated
community has between 65 and 106 houses and 0 otherwise. Large Gated community variable is
assigned a value of 1 if gated community has between 126 and 181 houses and 0 otherwise.

68

number of properties, thus effectively reducing the net benefits of living in a gated
community. Alternatively, larger gated communities may be less convenient requiring
residents to travel further to a gate when entering or exiting the community.25 In
addition, larger gated communities perhaps lack the same cohesiveness and sense of
community often found in medium and smaller communities.
In Model 3, we study the impact of affluence on gated community values. More
affluent gated communities, because of higher real and personal property values, may
assign higher values to gates and fences as compared with less affluent gated
communities. Gated communities in our sample are separated into “Higher Priced” and
“Lower Priced” groups. To classify communities as higher or lower priced, we first
determine a median sale price for each gated community over the entire twelve-year
study period. Then, we find a median of medians. If median sale price of a particular
gated community is above the overall median of medians, the gated community is
considered a higher priced community and vice versa for lower priced gated
communities. Since we have 11 gated communities in our sample, the median of medians
is equal to one of the gated community’s median price. For that gated community, we
determine an average sale price as well as the median price. If mean sale price is higher
than the median sale price for that community, then it is considered to belong to the
higher priced group (and vice versa for the lower priced group).
In Model 3 each dummy variable (“higher priced gated community” and “lower
priced gated community”) captures the affluence effect on value of each gated
community. Results are shown in Exhibit 4 (Model 3). Similar to Model 1 and Model 2,
25

This observation is based on an anonymous reviewer’s comment.
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Model 3 represents a good fit with the adjusted R2 equal to 0.9180. Variance inflation
factors (VIF) are again tested in this model and it was found that all variables are highly
acceptable (all VIF’s <10.0). There are also no major changes in the overall model.
Model 3 finds that higher priced, more affluent gated communities carry higher
premiums of $45,991. Whereas, a lower priced gated communities command premiums
of $10,103. All relevant variables in Model 3 are statistically significant.
As in previous models, the additional features of gated communities are
statistically significant with an estimate of -$14,128. For example, people residing in
higher priced gated communities may assign little or no value to a community swimming
pool as they may already have pools on their properties (or tennis and basketball courts).
Also, the presence of additional community amenities appear to have negative values as
homeowners may be unwilling to pay for expenses associated with these benefits.
As an alternative to Model 3, we log sale price while holding all independent
variables constant. Results show that higher priced community gate premiums are 14.2%
greater than values for their matched non-gated communities; whereas, gate premiums for
properties located in lower priced communities are only 3.8% higher than for their
matched non-gated communities. These results provide further evidence that more
affluent gated communities command larger price premiums.26
Value premiums for gated communities may vary across time and may be
dependent on the housing market, thus we empirically test the sustainability of gate
premiums over different stages of an economic cycle. Model 4, shown in Exhibit 6,
measures relative price patterns temporally for higher and lower priced gated and non26

This model is not included but is available upon request.
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gated communities. To measure this, we broke the date of sale variables, B(y), into higher
priced gated, HGB(y), higher priced non-gated, HNGB(y), lower priced gated, LGB(y)
and lower priced non-gated, LNGB(y).27 As in Model 3, we divide our sample into higher
priced and lower priced communities based on median sale prices except, in this
situation, classification of gated communities is completed annually. We then track each
date of sale variables across time to determine price patterns for each community
classification. This allows us to measure the effect of the housing crisis on property
values and specifically the temporal sustainability of gate premiums before, during and
after the housing crisis. These date values are graphed in Exhibit 7, and for comparison,
the date variables from Model 1 are also plotted.
As previously discussed, gated communities carry price premiums only if they
have a positive benefit/cost ratio. Exhibit 7 indicates that prior to the subprime crisis
(where the crisis period 2008-2009 is shaded) gated communities carried significant price
premiums over non-gated communities. However, beginning in 2008, premiums for
higher priced gated communities declined, and only in 2012 did they appear to trend
upward. Although, the lower priced gated communities typically show a premium over
non-gated lower priced communities, gate premiums were not as great as found in higher
priced gated communities. It appears that the subprime crisis impacted values for all
communities in our sample; however, the decline in value was the largest for the higher
priced gated communities.

27

Each observation has only two non-zero time/value coefficients. Each time/value
coefficient reflects the proportion of the year before the sale date and the proportion of the year
subsequent to the sale date. For example, a sale in June 2008, located in the high property value
range and with a gate would be represented by two coefficients – hgb08 ($137,054) and hgb09
($73,583). These values are plotted in Exhibit 7 for higher priced gated properties along with
similar plots of other value properties.
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Exhibit 6 | Property Values in Gated Vs. Non-gated Communities from 2000-2012
(Model 4)
Notes: The dependent variable is the price of the property in USD. Adjusted R2 = 0.924.
Special Warranty Deeds and Trustee Deeds are compared to General Warranty Deeds; all
construction quality variables are compared to average quality of construction; annual
date of sale variables are compared to the base year, 2000; all siding types variables are
compared to wood siding; all house styles are compared to a traditional house style; all
locations are compared to location 8.
* Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1%
level.
Independent Variables
Coefficient
t-statistic
Estimate
Intercept
16,803
1.9*
hgb01: Property value in “Higher Priced” gated
61,797
6.2***
community
hgb02 -----//----9,514
1.1
hgb03 -----//----44,312
4.0***
hgb04 -----//----51,645
5.9***
hgb05 -----//----109,996
10.8***
hgb06 -----//----140,186
19.0***
hgb07 -----//----96,133
12.5***
hgb08 -----//----137,054
12.1***
hgb09 -----//----73,583
5.5***
hgb10 -----//----51,932
4.7***
hgb11 -----//----3,540
0.3
hgb12 -----//----77,195
6.7***
hngb01: Property value in “Higher Priced” non-gated
-47,206
-8.3***
community
hngb02 -----//-----18,272
-4.1***
hngb03 -----//-----8,754
-1.7*
hngb04 -----//----5,290
1.3
hngb05 -----//----33,790
7.3***
hngb06 -----//----47,357
12.0***
hngb07 -----//----78,684
17.7***
hngb08 -----//----55,047
11.5***
hngb09 -----//----50,081
9.2***
hngb10 -----//----25,237
4.4***
hngb11 -----//----22,270
4.1***
hngb12 -----//----29,623
5.9***
lgb01: Property value in “Lower Priced” gated
-13,337
-1.3
community
lgb02 -----//----9,391
1.2
lgb03 -----//-----3,490
-0.4
lgb04 -----//----26,251
2.8***
lgb05 -----//----16,071
2.0**
lgb06 -----//----40,577
5.9***
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Exhibit 6 | Property Values in Gated Vs. Non-gated Communities from 2000-2012
(Model 4)
Independent Variables
Coefficient
t-statistic
Estimate
lgb07 -----//----28,359
3.4***
lgb08 -----//----51,398
6.1***
lgb09 -----//----23,328
2.7***
lgb10 -----//----8,563
1.1
lgb11 -----//----20,626
2.3**
lgb12 -----//-----1,156
-0.1
lngb01: Property value in “Lower Priced” non-gated
-33,553
-6.4***
community
lngb02 -----//-----6,326
-0.8
lngb03 -----//-----11,313
-2.1**
lngb04 -----//----7,240
1.3
lngb05 -----//----10,993
2.5**
lngb06 -----//----22,834
4.0***
lngb07 -----//----32,685
6.8***
lngb08 -----//----13,242
2.1**
lngb09 -----//----12,896
2.1**
lngb10 -----//----175.41
0.0
lngb11 -----//-----4,041
-0.6
lngb12 -----//----387.61
0.0
Additional Features in Gated community
-13,007
-3.5***
Full Baths
11,931
9.9***
Half Baths
6,016
4.8***
Lot Square Footage
0.66
7.6***
Age
-1,669
-12.0***
Number of Stories
-3,823
-2.0*
Area of a gunite swimming pool
20.77
8.2***
Area of a vinyl swimming pool
12.30
4.3***
Area of a fiberglass swimming pool
-0.78
-0.1
Area of a concrete swimming pool
76.04
5.4***
Number of pre-fabricated fireplaces
2,443
2.5**
Area of a cabana
71.96
4.2***
Crawl space (1/0)
21,121
3.9***
Area of carport
42.78
4.3***
Area of garage
35.72
7.1***
Area of a stone patio
43.94
3.1***
Golf (1/0)
2,034
1.0
Stucco exterior wall (1/0)
8,598
1.4
Vinyl exterior wall (1/0)
22,810
1.5
Composite exterior wall (1/0)
9,077
0.4
Brick exterior wall (1/0)
14,169
2.6***
Stone exterior wall (1/0)
92,041
2.5**
Building style is Colonial (1/0)
-622.08
-0.2
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Exhibit 6 | Property Values in Gated Vs. Non-gated Communities from 2000-2012
(Model 4)
Independent Variables
Coefficient
t-statistic
Estimate
Building style is English (1/0)
4,768
1.2
Building style is European (1/0)
1,009
0.3
Building style is Old Style (1/0)
11,559
2.0**
Building style is Ranch (1/0)
-4,225
-0.4
Building style is Raised Ranch (1/0)
-41,459
-3.2***
Building style is Cape Cod (1/0)
1,929
0.1
Building style is Contemporary (1/0)
-26,534
-2.8***
Total living area
47.24
26.6***
Total Living Area * Good construction (1/0)
4.72
6.6***
Total Living Area * Good Plus construction (1/0)
11.69
12.3***
Total Living Area * Very Good Minus construction
20.71
19.5***
(1/0)
Total Living Area * Very Good construction (1/0)
50.17
22.4***
Total Living Area * Best construction (1/0)
86.92
44.0***
Special warranty deed (1/0)
-56,781
-22.0***
Trustee deed (1/0)
-46,341
-18.3***
Waterfront property (1/0)
28,153
4.3***
Loc1
-14,935
-3.2***
Loc2
68,100
15.9***
Loc3
72,980
19.3***
Loc4
5,856
1.1
Loc5
30,959
7.2***
Loc6
44,804
9.1***
Loc7
66,200
17.5***
Loc9
90,492
15.4***
Loc10
184,107
28.1***
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Higher Priced Gated Vs. Non-Gated
Communities
2-tail
Ho:
F-stat Pr.> F signif
hgb01=hngb01
99.9
0.00
99%
hgb02=hngb02
9.3
0.00
99%
hgb03=hngb03
20.9
0.00
99%
hgb04=hngb04
25.2
0.00
99%
hgb05=hngb05
50.0
0.00
99%
hgb06=hngb06 144.6
0.00
99%
hgb07=hngb07
4.3
0.04
90%
hgb08=hngb08
48.0
0.00
99%
hgb09=hngb09
2.7
0.10
hgb10=hngb10
4.9
0.03
90%
hgb11=hngb11
2.4
0.12
hgb12=hngb12
16.6
0.00
99%

Lower Priced Gated Vs. Non-Gated
Communities
2-tail
Ho:
F-stat Pr.> F signif
lgb01=lngb01
3.4
0.07
lgb02=lngb02
2.2
0.14
lgb03=lngb03
0.6
0.44
lgb04=lngb04
3.2
0.08
lgb05=lngb05
0.3
0.57
lgb06=lngb06
4.3
0.04
95%
lgb07=lngb07
0.2
0.65
lgb08=lngb08
13.6
0.00
99%
lgb09=lngb09
1.0
0.32
lgb10=lngb10
0.8
0.39
lgb11=lngb11
5.1
0.03
95%
lgb12=lngb12
0.0
0.90

Exhibit 7 | Annual Property Values in Gated and Non-gated Communities 2000-2012
Notes: Higher priced and lower priced gated and non-gated communities date of sale
variables are from Model 4, Exhibit 6. Overall trend line is based on date of sale variables
from Model 1, Exhibit 4. A statistical significance has been determined using an F-test
with a null hypothesis (H0) that the difference between gated and non-gated properties is
zero.
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Date variable differences for each year between higher priced gated and higher
priced non-gated as well as between lower priced gated and lower priced non-gated
communities are tested for statistical significance using an F-test with a null hypothesis
(H0) that the difference between gated and non-gated properties are zero. F-test results are
reported in the table under Exhibit 7. We observe that gated premiums for higher priced
gated versus higher priced non-gated communities were statistically significantly
different during eight years (2000-2008); however, differences were statistically
significant in only two (2010 and 2012) out of four years subsequent to the financial
crisis beginning in 2008. Alternatively, differences between lower priced gated
communities and lower priced non-gated communities display a different picture. Gate
premiums were statistically significant in only two (2006 and 2008) out of eight years
leading up to the financial crisis (2000-2008) for lower value communities. Only one
statistically significant difference (gate premium) is observed in 2011 after the crisis
period. However, for both higher priced and lower priced gated communities, even for
years when gate premiums were not shown to be statistically significant, positive
premiums indicate a positive benefit/cost ratio.
Referring back to Le Goix and Vasselinov (2013) who posit that gated
communities may contribute to a local increase in price inequality that destabilizes price
patterns at neighborhood levels, a similar pattern may have occurred in the Shelby
County prior to the recent financial crisis. Before 2008, higher price premiums between
gated and non-gate communities existed for more affluent homes. However, as a result
of the crisis, a number of businesses in Shelby County paying high salaries, such as
Morgan Keegan and First Tennessee, substantially reduced their labor forces and forced
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high earners to sell their homes at substantially reduced prices. Many of these homes may
have been in higher priced gated communities.
We perform several robustness checks finding that our main conclusions
associated with Model 1 remain valid and that all independent variable coefficients carry
the same sign and remain significant. First, we reduce our sample by excluding the most
expensive gated community and its comparable non-gated community (gated community
in Location 10 has a highest average sale price of $1,315,490). The results remain
consistent with Model 1, thus providing assurance that Location 10 is not substantially
impacting our results.28
Anselin (1998) and others suggest potential problems with real estate data (such
as house sale prices and neighborhood characteristics) suggesting that real estate data
tend to lack independence among properties and may demonstrate spatial autocorrelation
or spatially and serially clustered residuals, thus results may lead to incorrect conclusions.
Moulton (1990) provides an example showing data units that share the same observable
characteristics may also share unobservable characteristics that would lead to serially
correlated residuals and a downward bias for coefficients within those groups. In order to
correct for possibly serially correlated residuals, Figlio and Lucas (2004) correct standard
errors in their regression model through clustering at both location and time level when
dealing with housing sales data. Others including Genesove and Mayer (2001) use this
econometric approach to adjust clustered standard errors to resolve problems of
autocorrelation.29

28

This model is not reported but is available upon request.

29

In another application of dealing with possible serial autocorrelation of standard errors,
Benefield et al. (2011) use clustering of standard errors on firm level technique in order to
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We adjust for possible clustered standard error effects in Model 1 following
Petersen (2009).30 First, we estimate models using clustering by one dimensionneighborhood.31 To duplicate our initial dataset used in Model 1, we again remove
observations if sale price is greater than three standard errors above or below the
predicted price and sales with unusually large absolute values for Cook's distance
(>1.00).32,33 Coefficients for premiums of gated communities remain stable and strongly
significant. All other control variable coefficients remain consistent in direction and
significance. Further, as suggested by Thompson (2011), it may be appropriate to cluster
standard errors by two dimensions in order to deal with serial as well as spatial
correlation. Thus, we cluster standard errors in our model by two dimensions neighborhood and time (represented by a variable Year of Sale). Once again, our
previous findings are confirmed with consistent directions and significance of

determine the impact of the limited service brokerages on selling price and time on the market of
the property being sold. They find results similar to the original model used when standard errors
were not clustered.
30

Petersen (2009) provides and explains a set of alternative techniques to deal with
biased OLS standard errors that arise when panel data is used in finance research. Specifically the
author proposes clustering techniques using multiple dimensions in order to produce unbiased
standard errors.
31

Clustering by a much larger area - location instead of neighborhood has produced
similar and consistent results in our analysis
In contrast to “PROC REG” function in SAS® with built-in capabilities of subfunctions automatically removing observations based on standard deviations and Cook’s distance
(option “COOKD”), “PROC SURVEYREG” function lacks such capabilities therefore “manual”
removal of such observations has been employed.
32

33

Removing observations of Sale Price at 1% and 99% level has produced similar
results- the estimates for explanatory variables were in the same direction and levels of
significance have remained consistent.
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explanatory variable coefficients. Results for clustered standard errors by one and
multiple dimensions are not reported here but are readily available per request.34
5. Conclusion
This study applies hedonic modeling to assess the value of properties in gated
communities relative to residential real estate values in non-gated communities. Using a
data set of housing sales provided by the Shelby County Tennessee Assessor’s Office, we
select a sample of eleven gated communities and a sample of matched non-gated
properties in nearby or adjacent communities that serve as the control sample. Thus, we
formulate a relatively homogeneous sample of single family residential properties,
excluding properties with zero lots, both in gated communities and control samples. The
resulting four hedonic models all had adjusted R2 greater than 0.90. Also, while
controlling for other factors, we find that residential properties in gated communities
command a statistically significant price premium of $29,996. Gated community price
premiums most likely result from actual or perceived benefits associated with additional
privacy, home owner associations imposing tighter controls on maintenance, home design
and other externalities and the added assurances against crime and other undesirable
activities. Moreover, since gated communities provide for their own streets, lighting and
other services publically provided to non-gated communities by municipalities,
significant gate premiums result from net benefits versus additional homeownership cost
incurred by residents of a gated community. We also find that the presence of additional
amenities within gated communities reduces sale prices by $19,534. We posit that

Alternatively, “PROC GENMOD” function in SAS® has been used for clustering of
errors and produced similar consistent results. Numbers are not reported but are available per
request.
34
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additional maintenance costs associated with these amenities outweigh their benefits. It
appears that, whereas a gate has value, additional neighborhood amenities do not.
We further explore gated neighborhood price effects by determining if
neighborhood size, measured by the number of homes, has an impact on value. We find
that medium sized communities have the highest gate premiums relative to either small or
large communities. We also discover that more affluent (higher priced) communities
command higher statistically significant gate premiums, both in monetary and percentage
terms, than do less affluent (lower priced) communities.
Additionally, the time period for our data covers most of the housing cycle from
2000-2012. We examine whether gated communities sustained gate premiums both
before and after the 2008-2009 subprime crisis. We find that higher priced and lower
priced gated communities retained gate premiums differently before and after the
financial crisis period. Prior to the crisis, higher priced gated communities carried
significantly higher price premiums over comparable non-gated communities; whereas,
evidence of price premiums is mixed for lower priced gated communities. Subsequent to
the crisis we find that neither higher priced nor lower priced gated communities
command statistically significant gate premiums over their matching non-gated
counterparts. Our finding may change as home values increase subsequent to the crisis
period.
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CHAPTER 4
CONTROLLING HEALTH INSURANCE PURE PREMIUMS WITH A TWOTIERED PRIVATE/PUBLIC STRUCTURE

INTRODUCTION
America remains in the process of implementing and adjusting to the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, (better known as Affordable Care Act, or
ACA). The ACA has many desirable stipulations and constraints including the
elimination of preexisting condition exclusions, lifetime limits, portability and other
common restrictions on existing healthcare coverages. We propose a private/public, twotiered healthcare system that facilitates, universal healthcare coverage, a goal of the
ACA, but a structure that offers added private insurer healthcare affordability. Healthcare
coverage parameters, whether specified by the ACA or public desires, constrain insurers
and policy makers in minimizing realized healthcare costs. We demonstrate that a twotiered underwriting structuring offers a more affordable and cost transparent healthcare
system that may reduce total costs if nationwide competition among health insurers is
permitted.
An ongoing debate continues regarding private sector efficiency as compared to
the public sector;1 however, less debate exists regarding efficiency increases and cost
reductions observed with increased private sector competition (e.g., Greenbaum (1967),
Bikker and van Leuvensteijn (2008)). Thus, we suggest increased interstate and intrastate
competition among private health insurers to increase efficiency and potentially reduce
1

For example, see Davies (1971), Stevens (1984), Broomberg (1994), Prager (1994),
Rosenthal and Newbrander (1996), Cohen (2001), Cutler (2002), Parhizgari and Gilbert (2004),
Khan (2006).
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healthcare premiums. Health insurers are currently regulated by each state, and most
states have limited intrastate competition among insurers authorized to do business within
the state. Thus, it may be necessary to circumvent state regulation barriers to increase the
number of health insurers competing within each state.2 Given increased private
healthcare insurance industry competition, private sector insurers may provide more
efficient and lower cost coverage than would a single payer universal public healthcare
system. Arguably, private insurer administrators may facilitate more efficient
administration than a government administered system and perhaps more efficient
underwriting of risk. However, catastrophic (lower claim frequency and higher claim
severity) underwriting risks may be more efficiently managed by government because of
size; where, government, being essentially risk neutral, assess risk as the pure premium.
We demonstrate that by combining private insurer’s underwriting of higher
frequency/lower claim severity and more efficient administration, first tier, with a second
tier, catastrophic, national public reinsurance plan characterized by lower claim
frequency/higher claim severity, reduces private insurer, first tier, premiums by
approximately sixty percent. Thus, creating more affordable private healthcare insurance
system for every citizen. A national public second tier reinsurance system will underwrite
catastrophic risk at a cost similar to current ACA projections. Projected annual
catastrophic health insurance cost for all 310 million Americans is estimated to be $1.897

2

Parente, Feldman, Abraham and Yi (2011) also suggest that cross-state competition is
best way to reduce the number of uninsured.
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trillion; however, this facilitates an approximate 60 percent reduction in private policy
monthly health insurance premiums.3
As described above, the first tier of a two-tiered private-public national health
insurance plan is facilitated national or increased intrastate competition of private
insurers that administers both first and second tier health insurance claims. The publically
funded second tier will be underwritten by a national reinsurance plan allowing truncated
annual private insurer losses. For example, we propose that each private insurers annual
underwriting losses not exceed a pre-specified $15,000 level, and annual claims
exceeding $15,000 are underwritten/reinsured by local, state and/or Federal government.
All citizens will be afforded the opportunity to purchase a much more affordable
private healthcare plan (tier one coverage), where employer based insurance may be the
norm. Citizens who are unemployed or unable to afford even reduced private insurance
premiums may be offered local, state or Federal government assistance. A two-tiered
healthcare plan containing provisions of no restrictions on preexisting conditions, lifetime
limits and other common restrictions may result in adverse selection problems. However,
most of the adverse selection cost would be borne by the public reinsurance plan. Thus, a
more transparent system that effectively identifies additional public costs of more or less
liberal benefit plans will allow better decision making and benefit/cost analyses since
both benefits and costs are mostly borne by the public.
Private healthcare premium reductions result from significantly reduced pure
premium means and variances. Actual premiums are further reduced because of the
3

It may be argued that a projected annual cost for catastrophic coverage of $1.897 trillion
is higher than most projections for the ACA; however, actual healthcare costs observed in our
study are currently covered by a combination of individuals, hospitals, healthcare providers as
well as local, state and federal governments. We propose that these costs be consolidated between
private insurers and the federal government.
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common practice of private insurers setting rates at some confidence level above the
fiftieth percentile. Thus, significant reductions in means and variance will manifest in
significantly reduced offered premiums.
To reduce current healthcare insurance redundancy, the proposed two-tiered
system may replace other existing federal insurance plans such as Medicare, Medicaid,
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and most currently existing state plans.
Total cost of the combined distribution including both first-tier private and
second-tier public reinsurance system is estimated using data from the Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) for 2008 through 2012. MEPS data contains annual
total paid claims for over 22,000 individuals. We attempted to apply the actuarial model
presented in Appendix B that allow for consideration of contemporaneous dependencies
between default frequency and severity and first-order serial correlation; however, due to
the lack of specificity of individual claim data provided by MEPS, we are unable to
determine these dependencies and the extent to which they may affect predicted losses.
We, however, estimate insurer pure premiums for the entire distribution of claim losses
for each year and for both the first-tier private sector and the second-tier public
reinsurance plan.
Next section reviews previous healthcare insurance system literature, then we
discuss data and methodology, followed by discussion of results, and conclusion.
Appendix B introduces an actuarial model allowing for dependencies between claim
frequency and severity and serial dependencies.
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HEALTHCARE MODEL AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Healthcare Model
Globally, several approaches for administering and underwriting healthcare
insurance systems exist; however, identifying an optimal system may be politically
contentious since each healthcare system’s effectiveness depends on a myriad of factors
including total cost, accessibility, quality of care and personal and public affordability.
We develop a proposed healthcare insurance model that aspires to improve each of these
factors while assuming costs are similar to those observed from MEPS data and quality is
defined by current ACA healthcare parameters.
We first determine annual mean pure premiums as well as higher order statistical
parameters assuming a single payer model using MEPS data from 2008 through 2012.
We assume that actual premiums for private insurers are set at the 60 percent confidence
level, thus the variance as well as the mean pure premium are important. Assuming the
government to be risk neutral, we assume that actual costs are equal to the mean pure
premiums. Since administrative expense data are unavailable, we do not consider these
costs nor whether differentials exist between private insurer administrative costs and
government administrator costs. We estimate tier one premiums set at the 60th percentile
level for first-tier private insurers where claim losses are truncated at $15,000. Truncating
insurer losses results in an approximate 60 percent reduction in private healthcare
premiums since mean pure premium means and variances are also substantially reduced.
The second tier, catastrophic, reinsurance component is assumed to be underwritten by
the government, thus only the pure premium for annual catastrophic healthcare costs are
reported.
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Because of administrative cost data unavailability, we may only conjecture
whether healthcare administration and claim processing may be more efficiently
performed in the private sector as compared to the public sector, thus we make no claims
regarding private/public differences in efficiencies and administrative costs. However,
from an underwriting perspective, government being risk-neutral as compared to riskaverse private insurers, variance of paid claim losses are relevant for only private insurers
possibly giving government a cost advantage. Much of governments’ premium
advantage, however, is ameliorated if private insurer total losses are truncated at $15,000.
Literature Review
Efficiency of Public and Private Sectors. The debate on private versus public
sector efficiency continues, for example, Prager (1994) explains that government may
have lower production efficiency than the private sector mainly because of government’s
absence of a profit motive. However, pecuniary benefits may not be the sole determinant
of private vs. public efficiency. Government administrators may be more altruistic toward
employees and offer unwarranted wage and benefit packages. Prager also hypothesizes
that ownership structure of private enterprises may create reduced efficiency if private
firms are managed by an agent. Therefore, there are arguments for and against higher
private ownership efficiencies.
Davies (1971) using an example of two Australian airlines (one public and one
under private ownership) argues that efficiency differences exist between public and
private ownership because of the inability of public manager to divest or transfer
ownership and also due to a lack of specialization. This may result from public
administrators having less control of subordinates and less authority to terminate
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employment. Davies also suggests that private owners are on the front line of cost control
and benefits; whereas, rarely would citizens (public owners) consider more relaxed
controls on costs and benefits to be of consequence in a public franchise. Hence, lack of a
profit motive in a public franchise may lead to lower operating efficiency as compared to
a private sector.
Continuing to look for differences between private versus public efficiency,
Stevens (1984) examines differences in service costs and finds that private firms could
deliver most of services at much lower cost than local government entities. In addition,
she finds large discrepancies between municipal and private contractors in productive
efficiencies in delivering services, the latter being more frugal.
Broomberg (1994) provides several arguments favoring market competition in
providing health services. Increased competition improves technical efficiency in health
services providers and improved efficiency over the entire system. In addition, private
sector contractors tend to decentralize managerial tasks more than public sector managers
manifesting into increased efficiency. Alternatively, Palmer (2000) suggests that benefits
of market competition may affect only health services in developed countries. Rosenthal
and Newbrander (1996) argue that, for Asian countries, healthcare systems that
incorporate free market benefits and public sector involvement only as regulators fail to
reach potential market efficiencies. They argue for the expansion of insurance options
and development of reinsurance mechanisms which would protect insurance providers
from risks.
Cohen (2001) provides four reasons for perceived government sector
inefficiencies as compared to the private sector. Specifically, these are private sector
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profit motive (where emphasis on cost reduction is more apparent), government
overloaded bureaucracies, political pressure on decision-making, and state ownership of
business not conducive to government operations (e.g., insurance) which may endure
managers lacking specific expertise. Cohen posits that certain services and functions are
more effectively and efficiently performed by a private sector and some by government.
Parhizgari and Gilbert (2004) assert that private sector efficiency is evaluated
through productivity and the financial bottom line; whereas, politics for the well-being of
the general population may determine public organization decisions introducing
inefficiencies.
We argue that private sector, therefore, has advantage when it comes to efficiently
performing basic administrative and underwriting tasks dealing with health insurance as
compared to government sector.
Financing Universal Healthcare. A number of previous studies provide
frameworks for financing universal healthcare. For example, Moeller (1995) proposes a
model for affordable health insurance for all Americans based on federal redistribution of
credits and deductions from income taxes. Using data from the 1987 National Medical
Expenditure Survey, he proposes that reform of the U.S. healthcare system be financed
by a tax on employer benefits.
Globerman and Vining (1998) support the continuation of privately financed
healthcare positing that limiting private financing of health care will reduce backing of
public health care plans; thus, supporting the formation of a private/public healthcare
system.
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Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1999) develop a model showing that insurance may be the
most appropriate tool for managing low-frequency/high-severity risks. They maintain that
insurance has more social value for catastrophic low-frequency risk events, since most
insured individuals are less able to handle costs of these events, and should carry
catastrophic insurance coverage if health insurance is also purchased for highfrequency/low-severity health events. They also maintain that deductibles for low
frequency risks should never be greater than deductibles for high-frequency risks.
In addition, Parente, Feldman, Abraham and Yi (2011) address the issue of
uninsured population. Using 2005 MEPS data, they conclude that the best way to reduce
the number of uninsured is to allow the interstate competition of health insurance
providers.
Baumol (1967) posits that the health care sector is “non-progressive,” resulting
from very low price elasticity, predicting that wage increases in excess of productivity
growth will lead to unproportional increases in healthcare costs. Hartwig (2008),
empirically exploring Baumol’s model, concludes that very little can be done to prevent
health care expenditures from rising continuously in the future.
Further addressing the issue of inelasticity of demand for health coverage,
Ahking, Giaccotto and Santerre (2009) find that demand for private insurance is
relatively inelastic with price and income therefore it may be optimal to require universal
health insurance coverage.
Some researchers offer solutions to a problem of high health insurance costs
through introduction of alternative system of payments. For example, van Kleef et al.
(2009) propose a shifted deductible, an alternative to a traditional health insurance
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deductibles that considers relevant health risk characteristics for each insured. They find
that a shifted deductible, as compared to traditional deductibles, is more effective
(especially for high risk individuals) in lowering individual out-of-pocket expenditures.
Public insurance coverage expansion may have a negative effect on private
insurance coverage. The “crowd-out” concept, where public insurance expansions erode
private insurance coverage, rather than providing coverage to those otherwise uninsured,
is explored most notably by Gruber and Simon (2008). They provide evidence of the
crowd-out concept which is especially pronounced for families’ coverage.
Overcomplicating of Healthcare Plans. We argue that our two-tiered
private/public healthcare system first and foremost simplifies overcomplicated
administration of healthcare plans. Previous literature examines the issue of consumers’
lack of comprehension of health coverage. For example, Loewenstein et al. (2014)
suggests that consumers typically fail to understand traditional insurance plans, better
understand simplified private health insurance plans, and suggest that simple plans have
stronger appeal to consumers and change healthcare choices.
Glazer and McGuire (2011) support the regulation of premiums facilitating
enrollees selecting health coverage plans when compromises between efficiency and
fairness exist. In a related study, Cutler et al. (2010) examine factors affecting the
movement of individuals across health plans finding that adverse selection and aging in
place (plans with older enrollees increase its relative costs with time) are the most
quantitatively important factors affecting enrollees switching from one plan to another.
Ligon and Thistle (2008) examine the case in which individuals choose policies
with different combinations of coinsurance and deductibles. They show that if prices are
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actuarially fair, then high frequency risk averse individuals obtain full coverage. They
find that individuals who perceive that low frequency risk and high severity, catastrophic,
risk coverage is more beneficial obtain partial coverage and choose pure deductible, and
also trend toward policies with partial coverage and policies that combine coinsurance
and deductibles.
Under the proposed two-tiered public/private insurance plan, employer based
insurance is the norm. Royalty (2008) finds that employees highly value employer
insurance generosity and that insured employees value additional health insurance cost
increases significantly less than additional comparable wage increases. Author suggests
that there is marginal value of benefits provided by employers to employees which is of
greater value to employees than the cost to employers.
Affordable Care Act. The ACA has many desirable stipulations including the
elimination of preexisting condition exclusions, lifetime limits, portability and other
common restrictions on existing healthcare coverages and healthcare affordability. A
2008 survey by Krueger and Kuziemko (2013) suggests that under ACA approximately
35 million uninsured Americans would gain coverage4.
Dillinder (2014) suggests that the Affordable Care Act, by extending healthcare
coverage to young adults, effectively raises their wages.

4

As of March 2015, 11 million people have signed up for insurance coverage under the
ACA (see http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43900-2015-03ACAtables.pdf ). The most recent estimate by Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Joint
Committee on Taxation (JCT) suggests that an additional 24 to 25 million people will gain
coverage under ACA in the next decade with an estimated net cost of coverage provisions
totaling $1,207 billion (see http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/49973Updated_Budget_Projections.pdf.)
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The claim that the ACA will reduce healthcare costs is supported by Borger et al.
(2008) who forecast slower health spending growth in the long run and a lower Medicare
actuarial deficit relative to previous projections.
Harrington (March, 2010 and September, 2010) provides an overview of proposed
health care reform summarizing key provisions concerning coverage expansion,
insurance market reforms, and the projected costs and financing of the legislation.
We propose modifications to current healthcare funding and administration
addressing affordability given constraints of incorporating current ACA positive
provisions such as preexisting condition limitations, lifetime limits, portability and other
common restrictions on existing healthcare coverage.
Effect of Healthcare Coverage, Costs on Health of Population. We propose a
private/public healthcare system that facilitates essentially a universal healthcare system,
but one that offers added healthcare affordability, because uninsured individuals may
have a detrimental effect on the insured population in both monetary and health ways.
Previous studies suggest that uninsured individuals may affect health and mortality rates
for insured individuals. For example, Daysal (2012) examines the impact of uninsured
patients on patient mortality rates of in-hospital insured heart attack patients, finding that
increasing numbers of uninsured patients increase number of unpaid claims to hospitals,
which channels in less care to insured patents, increasing their mortality rates.
Also supporting a more universal healthcare system, Weathers and Stegman
(2012) find that expanding health insurance coverage to newly enlisted Social Security
Disability Insurance Beneficiaries significantly positively impacts both mental and
physical health with no significant effects on mortality.
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When health services are inexpensive or free, an issue of over usage of healthcare
system may arise. This has previously been addressed by Jung (1998) who analyzes
effects of co-payments for medical services and finding that such implementation lowers
the frequency of both medical and dental patient visits and increased the price per patient
visit.
Mougeot and Naegelen (2009) propose a system under which it is optimal to have
a fixed-cost policy for hospitals to charge patients if hospitals are altruistic. They show
that a cost-sharing rule must be used if hospitals are not altruistic and if price of a
patient’s care is extremely high.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
Data are obtained for 2008 through 2012 from the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey (MEPS) provided by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality of U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services. MEPS is a nationwide survey of households,
and individuals and their medical providers in the United States, and is considered a
complete data source for total costs associated with health care supplemented by medical
providers. MEPS has two major components, the Household Component and the
Insurance Component. We use the Household Component which collects data from
selected communities across the United States and is a national representative of health
care costs.5
Possible limitations in the MEPS data are cited by Cohen et al. (2009) since it
excludes individuals in institutions (only civilian, non-institutionalized population is
surveyed), thus they claim possible underreporting of individual medical events in the
5

See Cohen et al. (1997), (2009).
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MEPS data where expenditure estimates may be lower than estimates from the National
Health Expenditure Accounts, and there may be some misreporting of healthcare costs
due to a lack of technical knowledge.
Zuvekas and Olin (2009) also address concerns regarding underreported
healthcare costs suggesting that inpatient hospitalizations were accurately reported;
whereas, emergency room visits and office visits were underreported by households for
2001-2003. They further examine the issue of underreporting and underrepresentation of
high expenditure cases finding an approximate 19% gap between MEPS and Medicare
expenditures, however, simple adjustments may bring results in line.
Cohen et al. (2000), based on 1996 data, conclude that reluctant respondents in
the first round of the survey were significantly more likely to become non-respondents in
the second round of MEPS survey.6
We download individual “Household Component Event files” annually for 2008
through 2012. Four component event files for each year, Office-Based Medical Provider
Visits, Outpatient Visits, Emergency Room Visits, and Hospital Inpatient Stays are used.
Each component file contains a variable “DUPERSID” identifying each individual,
which is a combination of each person’s number and dwelling unit. In addition, we use
“EVNTIDX,” that is a unique identifier of a medical event for each person during each
year. We merge individual component files using the “EVNTIDX” variable, as each
medical event may have several components that constitute total healthcare costs (for
example, emergency room visit costs may lead to the same event’s hospital inpatient
stay’s costs - which together adds to total costs for a particular event for the individual in
question). From the Hospital Inpatient Stays component file we collect “IPTC” variable
6

Cohen (1998) provides a detailed discussion on the survey design of 1996 MEPS.
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data that is a total event charge, which may be a combination of “Total Facility Charge”
and “Total Doctor Charge.” From the Office-Based Medical Provider Visits component
file we collect “OBTC” variable data that is a “Household Reported Total Charge” for
event. From the Outpatient Visits component file, we collect “OPTC” variable which is a
total charge for event, a combination of “Total Facility Charge” and “Total Doctor
Charge.” From the Emergency Room Visits component file, we collect “ERTC” variable
data that represents total event charges, a combination of “Total Facility Charge” and
“Total Doctor Charge.” We compute a total healthcare cost for each individual for each
event. Thus, we obtain both the total number of healthcare events and the total annual
healthcare costs for each individual for each year.
Health insurance pure premia are defined as the base rate that would be charged,
with no individual deductibles or co-pays, by a risk neutral private insurer independent of
the insurer capitalization. This assumes that no possibility exists that insurers will fail to
honor guarantees or claims in the event of catastrophic health costs and assumes that
insured individual will absorb no healthcare costs from his/her own resources. We
present an actuarial model in Appendix B that facilitates the estimation of annual
healthcare cost pure premia using loss data for each individual identified in the MEPS
data for each year. Models for estimating insurance pure premia that allow for
dependencies between claim frequency and claim severity and serial dependencies of
underwriting losses were developed by Spahr and Escolas (1986), Spahr, Sunderman and
Amalu (1991), Gatti and Spahr (1997) and Spahr and Sunderman (2014). These models,
with some modifications may be used as the basis for this analysis; however, because of
the nature of the MEPS data, it is not possible to accurately determine the claim
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frequency, thus our analysis assumes independence between frequency and severity and
serial dependencies.
RESULTS
Figure 1 indicates cumulative costs distribution for 2012. As we observe from
survey reported expenditures, cumulative costs for majority of the population (about
22,789 people or 87.6% of the sample) were accumulating at a slower rate and were
roughly $50 million. However, cumulative costs for a low number of people in the
sample requiring reinsurance were quite high totaling to about $160 million.

Figure 1
Cumulative Costs Distribution For 2012
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Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the entire sample of surveyed
individuals for years 2008 through 2012. There were a total of 22,345 individuals
surveyed in 2010, the lowest and 26,020, the highest number of individuals surveyed, in
2012. Total mean annual paid claims per individual shows an annual growth rate of 4.84
percent from $8,090.83 in 2008 to a mean of $9,774.31 in 2012.7 Standard deviations,
maximum claims paid per individual, skewness and kurtosis measures are also given in
the table. If data allowed, we would use Appendix B, equation (1) to estimate total paid
claims:
E(P) = E(FS) = E(F)E(S) + Cov(F,S)

(1)

However, MEPS data does not give accurate estimates of claim frequency and
severity, thus we assume Cov(F,S) is zero8. We posit, however, that if all paid claims
were actually available for each individual, the dependence between claim frequency and
severity of each claim would be positive, especially for catastrophic cases.
Using total annual paid claim for 2012, the monthly MPP for an insured
individual is $814.53. However, the MPPs for private insurers, given that annual paid
claim total losses are truncated at $15,000 range from $3,475.42 in 2008 to $3654.04 in
2012, an annual increase of 1.26 percent per year. The monthly private insurer MPP for
an insured individual given annual truncated losses of $15,000 is $304.50. This
represents a reduction of approximately 60 percent in monthly private insurer MPP.
Also, note that the annual growth rate for truncated MPP is 1.26 percent; whereas, the
7

Maximum number of claims per individual varies from a low of 165 in 2012 to as high
as 326 in 2009. However, most likely underreporting of costs is more severe for lower cost
individuals than for high cost individuals where more costs are incurred in hospitals and therefore
number of claims is high.
8

Based on the data for 2008-2012 period, COV(F,S) is very close to zero and, therefore,
deemed negligible in our analysis.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of the Overall Sample
Reinsurance starts at $15,000
Year
2008
2009
Number of individuals
23,190
25,955
Number of individuals
20,625
22,940
requiring no reinsurance
%of Sample with no
88.9%
88.4%
reinsurance required
Number of Claims
(Frequency)
Average
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Skewness
Kurtosis

6.11
9.42
1
220
6.45
75.47

6.21
9.94
1
326
7.20
108.73

2010
22,345
19,173

2011
23,192
20,898

2012
26,020
22,789

88.2%

87.4%

87.6%

5.91
9.29
1
231
6.26
70.02

5.85
9.50
1
210
6.79
80.03

5.76
9.25
1
165
6.28
66.08

Total Charge Per
Individual ($)
Average
Standard Deviation
Maximum
Skewness
Kurtosis

8,090.83 8,305.71 9,120.63 9,275.83 9,774.31
40,037.94 28,473.52 34,299.51 38,107.86 41,165.17
4,097,025 1,006,914 1,184,835 1,383,353 1,628,470
50.99
10.09
11.36
16.27
15.70
4,766.02
170.72
207.11
406.87
397.26

Charge per Individual
Claim ($)
Average
Standard Deviation
Skewness
Kurtosis

1,370.55
8,857.47
42.34
2,909.34

1,308.48
5,814.72
26.10
1,212.55

1,614.73
9,985.09
40.74
2,591.31

1,557.98
7,458.99
26.80
1,151.54

1,750.87
9,308.14
24.01
840.75

Annual Total Claims Per
Individual
Truncated at $15,000
Average
Standard Deviation
Skewness
Kurtosis

3,475.42
4,961.57
1.53
0.81

3,554.80
5,012.44
1.49
0.69

3,551.92
5,027.70
1.50
0.69

3,710.75
5,125.82
1.43
0.44

3,654.04
5,098.42
1.45
0.52
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growth rate for the total population distribution MPP was 4.84 percent indicating that the
growth in healthcare costs is driven by catastrophic coverage increasing at a higher rate.
Table 2 presents statistics for the catastrophic public reinsurance coverage for
total annual per person claims exceeding $15,000. The average annual cost per
individual requiring catastrophic reinsurance, not including $15,000 private insurer
payments, are $41,727 in 2008 and $49,288 in 2012. If catastrophic reinsurance
coverage costs are spread over the entire sample population, annual catastrophic
reinsurance costs per individual are $4,615.40 in 2008 and $6,120.27 in 2012. This
represents an annual increase of 7.31 percent in the cost of catastrophic coverage during
our sample period. Figure 2 illustrates upward trends for both average annual costs per
individual requiring catastrophic reinsurance as well as coverage costs spread over entire
population for the time period from 2008-2012. This confirms that increases in costs of
catastrophic healthcare coverage is a major driver for increases in annual/monthly MPPs
on which insurers base health coverage rates.
Data for 2012 project annual MPP cost for public catastrophic health insurance
coverage for 310 million Americans at $1.897 trillion; however, this facilitates an
approximate 60 percent decline in private policy monthly health insurance premiums.
The proposed two-tiered plan will facilitate the goal of insuring the entire U.S.
population; however, obviously not without substantial public cost.
The advantages of the private/public two-tiered plan is its simplicity and the
increased efficiency of the private sector in underwriting and servicing/administering the
healthcare system along with the government’s role of being a better reinsurer for a
nationwide catastrophic healthcare insurance system. This plan places a major burden on
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Table 2
Reinsurance For Individuals with Total Claims Higher than $15,000 (Catastrophic
Cases)
A Pure premium may be calculated as F*S + COV(F,S); where F is average frequency of
number of claims requiring reinsurance, S is average severity per claim requiring
reinsurance, and COV(F,S) is the covariance between frequency and severity. However,
because of the manner that frequency of claims is reported, the value of the pure premium
appears to be invalid. *Average cost per individual requiring reinsurance not including
$15,000 private insurer payment **Total Cost Reinsurance per insured is the average cost
per individual not including $15,000 paid by private insurer and spread among all insured
individuals.
Year
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
% of individuals
11.1%
11.6%
11.8%
12.6%
12.4%
requiring
reinsurance
Annual Number of
Reinsurance
Claims
(Frequency)
Average
Standard Deviation

16.71
19.22

17.39
20.40

16.22
18.76

15.98
19.23

15.67
18.74

Dependencies
between Frequency
(F) and Severity (S)
of Losses
COV (F,S)
CORREL (F,S)

-84,349.97
-0.17

-73,001.23
-0.23

-95,968.19
-0.17

-76,096.05
-0.20

-94,897.53
-0.21

Annual charges for
reinsurance claims
only*
Average
Standard Deviation
Skewness
Kurtosis

$41,727.55
108,461.86
21.78
759.18

$40,898.78 $47,276.81 $44,165.97 $49,288.00
65,952.01 81,981.97 92,827.53 100,965.29
4.46
4.86
7.18
6.80
32.76
36.46
72.30
69.70

Annual charges for
reinsurance claims
across all
insured**
Average
Standard Deviation
Skewness
Kurtosis

$4,615.40
38,367.09
57.03
5,583.54

$4,750.90
26,016.58
11.85
224.18

100

$5,568.70
31,994.87
12.89
255.26

$5,565.08
36,059.37
18.25
484.79

$6,120.27
39,111.26
17.42
467.47

Figure 2
Reinsurance Cost From 2008-2012

government in defining and controlling benefit coverages since much of the additional
coverage costs will be borne by the local, state and federal government.
As previously expressed in the literature, Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1999) suggest
that private insurance may be most appropriate for managing low-frequency/highseverity risks; however, insurance has more social value for catastrophic low frequency
risk events. Thus, a comprehensive national healthcare plan offering catastrophic
coverage for high-frequency/high-severity health events may provide the highest level of
social benefit. We agree with Parente, Feldman, Abraham and Yi (2011) who conclude
that the best way to reduce the number of uninsured is to allow the purchase of private
health insurance across the state lines, but at substantially reduced premiums.
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CONCLUSION
It may be the case that the private healthcare insurance sector is a more efficient
administrator and underwriter than government; however, government, because of size
and neutral risk aversion, may be a superior underwriter for catastrophic losses. We
develop a proposal for a two-tiered private-public national health insurance plan where
private insurers perform most administrative functions, including claims processing and
basic underwriting: whereas, a national, public health, reinsurance plan allows first tier
private policies to have truncated annual losses. For example, when private insurers’
annual per person claims exceed $15,000, claims exceeding $15,000 will be
underwritten/reinsured by a single payer, public national health insurance system. This is
estimated to result in a 60 percent reduction in private healthcare insurer premiums and
afford citizens more inexpensive opportunities to purchase private health plans. Employer
based healthcare insurance will be the norm; however, for unemployed citizens and/or
those unable to afford even lower cost private insurance premiums, public assistance may
be provided.
We propose that the current Affordable Care Act (ACA) standards, including
removal of preexisting conditions, lifetime limits and other common restrictions currently
included in the ACA be preserved. However, we believe that the same coverage can be
offered more efficiently and at a lower overall cost using a two-tiered private-public
national health insurance plan than with the current ACA.
The public cost of a second tier National reinsurance system, borne by the public,
providing catastrophic healthcare coverage to all 310 million Americans is estimated at
$1.897 trillion. Thus, the total cost of both private low frequency/low severity healthcare
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coverage ($1.133 trillion) and public low frequency/high severity catastrophic coverage
($1.897 trillion) is estimated to be $3.03 trillion given 2012 data. We find that increases
in healthcare costs are mainly driven by increases in catastrophic coverage costs with
much lower cost increases attributed for non-catastrophic health insurance coverage.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

In the first essay I argue that variations in legal tradition and institutional settings
in different countries can alter the efficiency of resolving uncertainty about profitability
and cash flows of emerging firms. The main contribution of this essay is to provide the
first evidence of the impact of insider trading law enforcement on the learning process
among stock market participants. I focus on the ‘active’ enforcement of insider trading
laws, which aims to enhance investor protection in a given capital market. I show that
that learning plays a critical role in the stock price discovery process worldwide. My
empirical results indicate that enforcement of laws prohibiting insider trading speeds up
the rate of decline of analyst forecast errors with progression in a firm’s age, and
consequently firms are valued at their long run equilibrium values more quickly. The
economic implication of this phenomenon is also evident as the probability of stock price
crash during the 2008-2009 financial crisis period is significantly higher for firms with
higher analyst forecast errors and slower speed of learning before the crisis.
The second essay applies hedonic modeling to assess the value of properties in
gated communities relative to residential real estate values in non-gated communities.
Specifically, while controlling for other factors, I find that residential properties in gated
communities command a statistically significant price premium. I suggest that these price
premiums most likely result from actual or perceived benefits associated with additional
privacy, home owner associations imposing tighter controls on maintenance, home design
and other externalities and the added assurances against crime and other undesirable
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activities. Also, significant gate premiums may result from net benefits versus additional
homeownership costs incurred by residents of a gated community. Interestingly, I find
that the presence of additional amenities within gated communities substantially reduces
sale prices. I suggest that the additional maintenance costs associated with these
amenities outweigh their benefits. Also, I explore gated neighborhood price effects by
determining if neighborhood size, measured by the number of homes, has an impact on
value. I find that medium sized communities have the highest gate premiums relative to
either small or large communities. Lastly, I discover that more affluent (higher priced)
communities command higher statistically significant gate premiums, both in monetary
and percentage terms, than do less affluent (lower priced) communities. Higher priced
and lower priced gated communities heterogeneously retain their value through time.
In the third essay I develop a proposal for a two-tiered private-public national
health insurance plan where private insurers perform most administrative functions, while
a national, public health, reinsurance plan allows first tier private policies to have
truncated annual losses. I show that when private insurers’ annual per person claims
exceed $15,000, claims exceeding this amount will be underwritten by a single payer,
public national health insurance system. This is estimated to result in a 60 percent
reduction in private healthcare insurer premiums and afford citizens more inexpensive
opportunities to purchase private health insurance. I argue that robust health insurance
coverage can be offered more efficiently and at a lower overall cost using a two-tiered
private-public national health insurance plan than with the current ACA. In addition, I
find that increases in healthcare costs are mainly driven by increases in catastrophic
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coverage costs with much lower cost increases attributed for non-catastrophic health
insurance coverage.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: Table A1
Sample Composition
We analyze 51 countries listed in the first column. We include all companies in the equity
research lists maintained by Datastream International. We obtain the date of first
establishment and first enforcement of insider trading laws prior to March of 1999 from
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002). The updated dates of enforcement are obtained from
publicly available information as well as requests for information directly to respective
regulatory bodies of countries. We use the updated list of enforcement dates from our
research for Australia, Austria, China, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Philippines, Portugal, Russia, and South Africa. We measure the quality of regulatory
infrastructure based on four aspects of World Bank’s World Governance Indicator index
developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2011). The four aspects include
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. We
find a value for each one of these indicators for each country by averaging the estimates
provided by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi from year 1996 to 2011. To calculate the
WGI index we add the values for each indicator for each country. Constructed index can
range in value from -10(worst) to 10(best).
Country
Year if first
Year of first
WGI Regulatory
establishment
enforcement
Infrastructure
of insider trading
of insider trading
Index
law
law
Argentina
1991
1995
-1.43
Australia
1970*
1991*
7.11
Austria
1993
2000*
7.18
Belgium
1990
1994
5.70
Brazil
1976
1978
-0.16
Canada
1966
1976
7.25
Chile
1981
1996
5.34
China
1993
2003*
-1.14
Colombia
1990
No
-0.86
Czech Republic
1992
1993
3.20
Denmark
1991
1996
8.33
Egypt
1992
2012*
-1.23
Finland
1989
1993
8.20
France
1967
1975
5.50
Germany
1994
1995
6.62
Greece
1988
1996
2.58
Hong Kong
1991
1994
6.66
Hungary
1994
1995
3.32
India
1992
1998
-0.71
Indonesia
1991
1996
-2.23
Ireland
1990
2002*
6.52
Israel
1981
1989
4.17
Italy
1991
1996
2.35
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Table A1
Sample Composition
Country

Japan
Luxembourg
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Russian Federation
Singapore
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Thailand
Turkey
United Kingdom
USA
Venezuela
Zimbabwe

Year of first
establishment
of insider trading
law
1988
1991
1973
1975
1993
1989
1988
1985
1995
1991
1982
1991
1986
1996
1973
1989
1976
1994
1987
1971
1988
1988
1984
1981
1980
1934
1998
2004*

Year of first
enforcement
of insider trading
law
1990
No
1996
1996*
No
1994
2004*
1990
2004*
1994
1999*
1993
2003*
2007*
1978
1999*
1988
1998
1996
1990
1995
1989
1993
1996
1981
1961
No
No
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WGI Regulatory
Infrastructure
Index
4.75
7.32
2.35
-0.25
-0.50
7.61
7.75
7.30
-2.93
-0.88
-1.13
2.31
4.40
-2.64
7.86
1.56
2.99
4.94
-0.42
7.66
7.60
3.63
0.38
0.29
7.07
6.24
-4.26
-5.60

Appendix B: Actuarial Model
Many types of insurance require an actuarial model to estimate annual pure
premia by using loss data for each risk unit. In the case of health insurance the risk unit is
each individual identified in the MEPS data for each year. Models for estimating
insurance pure premia that allow for dependencies between claim frequency and claim
severity and serial dependencies of underwriting losses were developed by Spahr and
Escolas (1986), Spahr, Sunderman and Amalu (1991), Gatti and Spahr (1997) and Spahr
and Sunderman (2014). These models, with some modifications, are the basis for this
analysis and possibly could be applied to health care coverage if the data allowed.
Health insurance pure premia are defined as the base rate that would be charged,
with no individual deductibles or co-pays, by a risk neutral private insurer independent of
insurer capitalization. The pure premium assuming no insurer failure to honor guarantees
or claims in the event of catastrophic health costs and assumes that insured individuals
will absorb no healthcare costs from his/her own resources.
Estimating Pure Default Premium
An actuarial model for estimating the mean pure premium (MPP) for healthcare
underwriting costs must be consistent with the relatively unique nature of its risk. It is
typical that most insured annual losses result in low frequency of claims and low claim
severity, but the potential exists for catastrophic losses represented by both high claim
frequency and high claim severity. This means that during a given year most insured
individuals will submit a small number of claims to be paid, and that each of the claim
amounts will be relatively small, but there is a probability that an insured individual has
annual catastrophic healthcare underwriting costs representing both high numbers of
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claims to be paid (high frequency) and high costs for each claim (high severity) resulting
in major underwriting losses.
The potential for increased insured individual healthcare losses as well as the
insurers’ total healthcare claims expense may exist because of the presence of a positive
correlation between the frequency and severity of losses, and the potential for serial
increases in healthcare costs. For instance, healthcare costs may increase annually
because of increasing costs of services or from systemic changes due to adding
previously uninsured individuals and age classifications, reducing exclusions for
preexisting conditions, increasing or having no limits on coverage, new available and or
increasing treatment cost and a changing population of insured individuals. As defined
above, a positive covariance between claim frequency and severity may result in
individual cases displaying high claim frequency, high claim severity and high total
losses for the healthcare insurers. The correlation may be due to spatial (time series)
dependencies among insured individual or to a direct relationship between frequency and
severity. These individuals historically sometimes have hit limits for specific coverages
that reduce healthcare underwriting losses; however, if these limits are increased or
eliminated cost for catastrophic health events, these cost may increase significantly.
Increased coverage mandated in the Affordable Care Act represents many of the
systemic factors cited above.
Unlike life and automobile insurance, it may be unreasonable to assume that
frequency and severity of healthcare underwriting losses are independent. Younger
insureds individuals generally have fewer health care claims and perhaps generally lower
costs per claim; however, as insured individuals age, both frequency and severity of
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claims may increase. As a consequence, the correlation between frequency and severity
may be positive. Furthermore, since individual health care requirements may last for
more than one year, individual health underwriting risk may display a time or spatial
dependency. High loss rates for an individual in one year may be a good indication of
high loss rates for the same individual in the next year.
The proposed model considers the relevant parameters and the resulting aggregate
pure risk premium for each insured individual risk.9 To establish these relationships, let:
F = frequency of annual claims (number of claims per year per individual);
S = severity of each claim- $ of paid claims per claim per individual;
P = pure risk premium-total $ of claims paid per year per individual;
T = total losses incurred in the population of insured individuals per year;
E(F) = the expected value for the number of annual paid claims (frequency) per insured
individual;
σ2F = the variance of claim frequency per insured individual;
E(S) = the expected annual dollar loss (severity) per insured individual;
σ2S = the variance of annual losses (severity) per insured individual;
Cov(F,S) = the covariance between the annual frequency of claims and the annual
average severity of claim losses per insured individual;
E(P) = the expected annual mean pure risk premium per individual (MPP) for the insured
population;
σ 2P = the variance of annual total underwriting losses per individual for the population of
insured individuals (variance of MPP);
9

While the model allows for the interdependence of default and severity rates, it does not
impose such a condition if it is not present.
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Cov(i,j) = the covariance for MPP (if any) between the ith and jth individual insured;
E(T) = the expected total annual incurred dollar loss for the health insured population;
σ 2T = the variance of annual total incurred dollar losses for the population; and
i,j = the correlation for MPP between total paid claims for the ith and jth risks.
The mean and variance for individual pure risk premiums are:
E(P) = E(FS) = E(F)E(S) + Cov(F,S)

(A1)

and
σ2P = E(F)2σ2S + E(S)2σ2F + 2E(F)E(S)Cov(F,S). 10

(A2)

For each individual risk, we initially posit that the term Cov(F,S) is slightly
positive, e.g. the severity, annual claim losses for each individual, tends to be positively
correlated with the frequency or number of annual paid claims per individual.
Relationships (A1) and (A2) demonstrate the possible bias resulting from simply
multiplying the expected annual frequency and severity to obtain expected annual loss
estimates. Because of possible covariance between frequency and severity, expressions
(A1) should be used to estimate annual health insurer losses per risk unit. Ignoring the
third term in (A1) assumes independence between frequency and severity.

10

According to Goodman (1960), the variance of the product of two dependent random
variables is
σ2P = E(F)2σ2S + E(S)2σ2F + 2E(F)E(S)E11 + 2E(F)E12 + 2E(S)E21 + E22 - E112
(a)
where E11 = Cov(F,S)
E12 = E(F - E(F)) (S - E(S))2
E21 = E(F - E(F))2(S - E(S)) and
E22 = E(F - E(F))2(S - E(S))2
Given these relationships, it is clear that equation (b),
σ2P = E(F)2σ2F + E(S)2σ2S + 2E(F)E(S)Cov(F,S)
(b)
is a good approximation for determining the variance of the MPP for an individual risk since the
remaining terms are relatively small.
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Total expected losses for the population of insured individuals is a function of the
number of insured individuals, N, and the expected pure risk premium.
E(T) = NE(P),

(A3)

and
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Then if Cov(i,j) equals zero for i  j, equation (A4) becomes

2 


N



 2  N 2

i 1

(A5)

i

i

If the correlation coefficient, Cov(i,j)/ij, equals one for all i and j, equation (A4)
becomes
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(A6)

2
i

Assuming a first order autoregressive stationery process with 0    1, where J is the N
by 1 vector of ones.

First order autocorrelation will be used as a proxy for the dependence of one person’s
healthcare annual cost being correlated to a second individual’s annual healthcare costs. Thus,
Cov(Pt,Pt-1) is used as the proxy for Cov(i,j) and  = Cov(Pt,Pt-1)/P2.
11
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where M is the average sum of each column of the correlation matrix in (A7) after taking
out the diagonal of ones.12
An estimate of (A7) is

 T2  N  2p  NM  2P

(A8)

If N represents the number of individual risk units observed in the sample, the
population Mean Pure Premium (MPP), P , will be identical to the individual MPP.
E( P ) =

E ( T)
N

= E(P)

(A9)

Because of the Central Limit Theorem, P may be assumed to be normally
distributed. This assumption is valid regardless of the underlying distribution of x or the
covariance relationships if 1) the distribution has a finite variance that is known or that
can be estimated and 2) the sample size is sufficiently large to offset skewness in the
underlying distribution. In this situation, sample size will not be a problem.
In an insurance context, the degree of confidence in measuring the mean pure
premium depends on the quality of historical loss data and the consistency of economic
conditions affecting health care costs. For samples taken for a smaller number of insured

12

For equations (A5) through (A8), N represents the total number of individuals covered
by health insurance, and first order autocorrelation for annual losses serves as a proxy for loss
dependencies across individuals for equations (A9) through (A12).
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individuals or for a shorter number of years, a large confidence interval should be used.
If there is a large sample of observations covering a wide distribution of insured
individuals, the underwriting loss confidence interval may be considerably smaller. This
is the situation for our sample of approximately 25,000 individuals measuring losses for
health insurers. Based on the approach taken here, the general expression for the percent
confidence interval is given by equation A10.
___
2 (1  M )
P  Z / 2  P
N

where P is the estimate of

(A10)

 P and Zα/2 varies with the size of the desired two tailed

confidence interval with α/2 area in each tail.
With the proposed two tiered private-public health insurance system, the mean
pure premium for the privately underwritten first-tier may be estimated by using the
average number of individual claims (frequency) and average severity of claims
(severity) for all each individual’s paid claims resulting in cumulative losses reaching but
not exceeding a predetermined maximum loss level. For example, if for the private
insurer, the maximum loss level per individual is $15,000, all claims up to $15,000 per
year would be paid by the private insurer. All paid claims exceeding maximum loss level
per individual of $15,000 annually are paid by the National health insurance system.
Thus, we will determine parameters for loss distributions for both the private
underwriters and the public insurance system from the data. Because of the law of large
numbers, we may assume that expected losses for both private insurers and the public
system are normally distributed. Thus, even if the average individual incurs total paid
claims of significantly less than $15,000 per year, some individuals will undoubtedly
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incur catastrophic underwriting losses significantly higher than the $15,000 cut off that
will be underwritten by the National insurance system.
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